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Abstract—To counter man-at-the-end attacks such as reverse engineering and tampering, software is often protected with techniques
that require support modules to be linked into the application. It is well-known, however, that attackers can exploit the modular nature of
applications and their protections to speed up the identification and comprehension process of the relevant code, the assets, and the
applied protections. To counter that exploitation of modularity at different levels of granularity, the boundaries between the modules in
the program need to be obfuscated. We propose to do so by combining three cross-boundary protection techniques that thwart the
disassembly process and in particular the reconstruction of functions: code layout randomization, interprocedurally coupled opaque
predicates, and code factoring with intraprocedural control flow idioms. By means of an elaborate experimental evaluation and an
extensive sensitivity analysis on realistic use cases and state-of-the-art tools, we demonstrate our technique’s potency and resilience
to advanced attacks. All relevant code is publicly available online.
Index Terms—man-at-the-end attacks, control flow graph reconstruction, reverse engineering, resilience, potency
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1 INTRODUCTION
Software protection techniques such as code obfuscation
and remote attestation aim to mitigate man-at-the-end
(MATE) attacks that target software assets that come with
confidentiality and integrity requirements.
The protections typically do not aim to prevent attacks
completely. Because MATE attackers have white-box access
to the software in their labs, the protections aim to raise
the costs of (i) identifying successful attack vectors in the
attacker’s lab, and (ii) scaling up the attacks to exploit them
outside the lab. The protections are in many cases best-
effort rather than providing well-defined security, and part
of their protection comes from security through obscurity.
In practice, their effectiveness decreases when attackers gain
more knowledge about their inner workings.
To be effective, protections should provide resistance
against many of the possible methods with which they can
be overcome, worked around, bypassed, and undone [1].
Multiple protections defending against different attack
methods hence need to be layered upon each other, ideally
to the point where attackers consider the attack path of least
resistance not profitable enough to attack the software.
Advanced protections, such as code mobility [2], barrier-
slicing with server-side execution [3], remote attestation [4],
anti-debugging by self-debugging [5], and instruction set
randomization [6], are deployed by means of two forms of
adaptions to that software. First, components implementing
functionality of the protections are linked into the software.
Secondly, the original code is transformed.
To delay an attacker in overcoming protections, it is use-
ful to embed the linked-in protection components stealthily,
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meaning hard to identify. For that reason, protections com-
ponents are always linked statically into native software to
be protected, whether that software is itself a main binary
or a dynamically linked library. Static linking does not offer
very strong protection, however. In experiments with both
professional penetration testers and amateur hackers [1], we
have observed that once attackers identify a small part of a
statically linked-in protection, they can all too easily expand
their reverse-engineering to the most vulnerable program
points. Beyond static linking, a number of design obfusca-
tions (such as function merging, inlining, and outlining) are
available to obfuscate the design of the interfaces between
the application and the protection components, but those
can only be deployed when all source code is available.
In practice, this is not the case: vendors of protection tools
do not make the source code of their protections available
to their customers, because of the practical security-by-
obscurity reasons. There hence exist few practical tech-
niques to obfuscate how protection components are inte-
grated into the software they help to protect. While some
security vendors have post-processing tools to secure their
components after they are integrated into their customers’
software, both the inner workings of those tools and their
effectiveness are tightly protected secrets.
In this technical report, we present novel techniques and
combine them with adaptations of existing techniques to hide the
location and boundaries of software components that are linked
together, including linked-in protection components, with the goal
of hampering MATE attacks.
All our techniques are based on post link-time binary
rewriting. It hence does not suffer from module boundaries
and separate compilation the way compile-time or source
code techniques do. It offers an additional advantage over
source-to-source code rewriting, as our techniques are not
limited to the expressiveness of the used source language(s).
Our combined techniques are (1) whole-program code
layout randomization, (2) insertion of fake direct control
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2flow transfers between procedures, and (3) factorization of
code fragments common to multiple components without
embedding them in separate functions. Together, they make
it much harder to for attackers and their tools to identify
and structure the relevant code and the control flow in the
program. Moreover, as our evaluation will demonstrate, the
combination of techniques is resilient against a number of
commonly used and academic state-of-the-art manual and
automated deobfuscation techniques.
This technical report offers the following main contribu-
tions:
• We present new forms of code factoring to serve as
module boundary obfuscations.
• We discuss how to combine them with code layout
randomization and opaque predicates to resist auto-
mated and manual attacks.
• We present an open-source tool chain that imple-
ments the presented techniques.
• We analyse and evaluate the presented techniques on
use cases of real-world complexity.
• We perform a sensitivity analysis on the obfuscator’s
most relevant parameters.
This technical report is structured as follows: Section 2
discusses our attack model. Sections 3–5 discuss the three
forms of obfuscations we combine. Section 6 presents an
elaborate quantitative experimental evaluation including an
extensive sensitivity analysis, after which Section 7 dis-
cusses related work and Section 8 draws conclusions and
looks forward.
2 ATTACK MODEL
We protect native software from man-at-the-end (MATE)
attacks. MATE attackers have full access to, and full control
over, the software under attack and over the end systems on
which the software runs. They can use static analysis tools,
emulators, debuggers, and all kinds of other hacking tools.
The attacks are looking to break integrity and confidentiality
requirements of assets embedded in the software, e.g., to
steal keys or IP, or to break license checks and anti-copy
protections. They do so mainly by means of reverse engi-
neering and by tampering with the code and its execution.
MATE protections mostly aim at economically driven
attackers [7]. They are considered effective when the
provider’s cost of deploying the protections is compensated
by a resulting reduction in the loss of income due to
successful attacks. This reduction can result simply from
delaying attacks. The protection is maximally effective if
it stops attackers before they reach their goal, or even
before they start an attack, e.g., because the (supposed
or observed) presence of protection lowers the attackers’
perceived return-on-investment to the extent that they give
up.
MATE attackers execute an attack strategy in which they
execute a series of attack steps. The strategy is adapted on
the fly, based on the results obtained with previous attack
steps. These include the testing of hypotheses regarding
assets and protections. We refer to literature for more in-
formation on and models of MATE attack processes on
protected software [1].
To be effective, protections deployed on software and
assets should cover as many as possible relevant attack
paths, i.e., paths that might be paths-of-least-resistance for
certain attackers. It is commonly accepted that this can only
be achieved by combining many protections in a layered
fashion. The deployed protections then become assets them-
selves, that protect each other just like they protect the
original assets.
In this section, we focus on the attack processes and at-
tack activities that are impacted by the protections presented
in this technical report. These are the essential processes of:
• identifying and structuring the code components and
their functionality at different levels of granularity
and abstraction;
• identifying relevant relations between components;
• determining their features based on the relations;
• browsing through those elements to locate and iden-
tify the relevant fragments on which to execute addi-
tional attack steps.
Attackers use tools, techniques, and heuristics to build
structured program representations such as control flow
graphs (CFGs), call graphs, execution traces, data depen-
dency graphs, etc. of disassembled binary code.
They then build mental models of the software in which
they assign meaning (i.e., some higher-level semantics)
to the different components and derive relevant features
thereof. They do so in terms of all the concepts they know
as relevant from past experience [1].
This assignment process and the derivation of features
is typically an iterative process that starts from easily iden-
tified elements such as API calls and system calls, XOR-
operations, references to strings, known patterns or finger-
prints of certain algorithms, etc. That leads the attacker
towards the specific components of interest, such as the
data or code he wants to lift from the software, or those
parts of protections he wants to tamper with to overcome
the protections. Table 1 lists some of the relations between
components that attackers exploit.
It is clear that if we can prevent tools from correctly
identifying the relevant relations and structures, we can
make the attacks harder to execute. From conversations with
professional reverse engineers at Dagstuhl Seminar 17281
in July 2017, we also learned that if tools present incorrect
relations and structure, this hampers attackers even more
because they then waste additional time performing activi-
ties based on incorrect assumptions and data.
From the field of software engineering, we know that
code comprehension benefits from well-structuredness of
the code [8], [9] and a separation of concerns, with each
fragment having a single responsibility. It then follows that
attackers have a harder time comprehending code that does
not adhere to structures and concepts they are familiar with.
In this technical report, we build on the hypothesis that
attackers have a harder time handling code fragments that
each individually implement multiple parts of multiple, un-
related high-level functions in a program, in particular when
those code fragments are not structured correspondingly.
Concretely, consider the procedures in a program. At-
tackers recognize procedures by their prologues and epi-
logues, and by the fact that they are invoked through
3Relation exploited by attackers Examples of exploitation in concrete attack
Control flow transfers Disassemblers such as IDA Pro deploy recursive descent al-
gorithms to identify code bytes to be disassembled and to be
partitioned into functions.
Data flow dependencies If an attacker has observed that values are XOR’ed before they
are output, he often assumes they are being encrypted. The
code that produces the mask used in the XOR then draws the
attention of the attacker if he is after the embedded encryption
key.
Spatial proximity of code fragments in code sections If an attacker has identified a code guard function, e.g., because
it reads from the code sections as it hashes the code bytes, he
looks in the proximity of that function for other functionality
related to tamper detection, such as the functions that check the
final hash value. This is based on the assumption that related
functionality is linked into the program together.
Temporal proximity of code fragments in an execution trace When an attacker tampers with the code of a program, and as a
reaction the program halts almost immediately, the attacker will
focus on the code executed right before the halting to find the
code fragment that checks the integrity of the code.
Spatial proximity of data stored in memory When attackers know that structs on the heap hold values with
known patterns as well as unknown values they want to steal,
they search for the known patterns to find the locations of the
values to steal.
TABLE 1: Relations between structured software components and uses thereof by attackers.
function calls. It is a natural assumption that procedures
can be invoked from within different contexts. As long
as the semantics of the function in the multiple contexts
are somewhat related, i.e., it performs roughly the same
functionality in those contexts, the process of assigning a
meaning to the function can require little effort.
It becomes much harder, however, to comprehend code
if a function implements multiple completely unrelated
functionalities, depending on the context from which they
are called. This is exploited by obfuscation techniques called
function merging and fusion [7]. The fused function is then
invoked from completely unrelated contexts, to perform
completely unrelated computations, i.e., to implement very
different semantics.
Comprehending the code becomes even harder if the
code fragment that implements those different function-
alities in different contexts is not even recognizable as
such, i.e., if it does not look like a procedure in the first
place. In software obfuscation, it is also a well known
technique to hide calls, returns, epilogues and prologues
by replacing their standard assembler idioms by alternative
instruction sequences with the same semantics but with
different looks [10]. This thwarts disassemblers that do
not recognize the replacements, and it slows down human
reverse engineers.
The obfuscations proposed in this work explicitly build
on this observation about the challenges that human at-
tackers face when they try to attack and reverse engineer
software. The obfuscations do so by factoring out code
(outlining code) from unrelated contexts without putting the
factored code in separate procedures, instead using control
flow idioms typically used for intraprocedural transfers.
Not only humans are challenged when facing such fac-
tored out code fragments. Automated attack steps, such as
de-obfuscating transformations and data flow analysis on
which attackers rely, are also hampered.
First, it is well known that many data flow analyses re-
turn more precise results when their sensitivity is improved.
Higher sensitivity, e.g., in the form of flow sensitivity,
path sensitivity, or context sensitivity comes at the cost of
rapidly increasing running times and resource consumption,
however, so attackers need to compromise between more
precision and faster analyses. While context sensitivity has
been shown to be both useful and practical in the context
of multiple whole-program binary analyses such as liveness
analysis and constant propagation [11], [12], [13] we know
of no path sensitive variants that are practical. As context-
sensitive analyses do not consider separate contexts for
factored code fragments that do not look like procedures,
they are of little help to attackers that aim to recover the
same information they would on unprotected code.
Secondly, powerful, automated de-obfuscation ap-
proaches are available that build on the detection of quasi-
invariant behavior in obfuscated code. In essence, those
techniques iteratively filter out and simplify instructions
that are observed to behave quasi-invariantly (i.e., instruc-
tions that produce the same result every time they are
executed on some selected program inputs), as well as
code that does not contribute to the software semantics
(i.e., to the input-output relation the software displays
for the selected inputs). This de-obfuscation approach has
been shown to succeed in undoing obfuscations ranging
from opaque predicates (with corresponding conditional
branches that are either always or never taken) to the use
of packers (because the unpacking of program code does
not depend on program inputs). Based on our experience
with human attackers, this form of de-obfuscation is also
performed mentally by attackers that analyze code man-
ually, i.e., when attackers derive properties from program
behavior observed, e.g., with debuggers. Although such
derivations are often unsound, MATE attackers only care
about the result, not about soundness.
By factoring out code fragments from multiple, unre-
lated contexts, we aim to prevent that the fragments and
the surrounding control flow behave invariantly, and hence
that they fall victim to the generic deobfuscation approach.
In summary, with the protections presented in this tech-
nical report, we aim to protect against MATE attacks on bi-
4nary code, and we specifically aim for hampering a number
of relevant manual and automated MATE attack steps.
We concede that this attack model is fuzzy, rather than
well-defined. To the best of our knowledge, in the domain
of practical software protection against MATE attacks, there
is no alternative, however.
3 CODE LAYOUT RANDOMIZATION
Attack heuristics include spatial proximity. Each source
code file typically contains code fragments that are closely
related. Software libraries to link programs against are also
structured along related functionality.
Compilers and linkers typically do not mix the binary
code generated for different functions in a source code file.
Whole function bodies are typically placed one after another
in the text sections of object files, and text sections of object
files are placed one after the other in linked applications or
libraries, in which they are largely grouped by the archive
from which they were linked in. Unless countermeasures are
taken, related code fragments are hence more likely located
close to each other in binaries. Attackers hence sometimes
use proximity as a guide during their hunt for code to attack.
In other words, they sometimes browse the code linearly.
Taking countermeasures in a link-time rewriter like Di-
ablo [11] is trivial, as already demonstrated in the context
of software diversification [14]. Mixing unrelated code can
be done at any level of granularity, because all code is
represented in one big CFG [11], from which binary code
in virtually any (randomized) order can be generated.
The level of granularity at which the code layout is
randomized has to be considered carefully. At the coarsest
level, we can simply leave function bodies intact, but ran-
domize their order throughout a whole program or library,
as previously proposed to prevent memory exploits [15].
This already breaks proximity assumptions regarding the
archive and compilation unit levels. By mixing protection
and application functionality, we can already improve the
stealthiness of protection components. For example, iden-
tifying one function as one code guard computation then
no longer automatically leads the attacker to the related
functionality in related functions.
We can also randomize the order of instructions and
basic blocks, and mix instructions from all function bod-
ies. At the abstraction level of instructions, code is most
often represented and analyzed in CFGs constructed by
disassemblers such as IDA Pro, Binary Ninja, GHIDRA, or
DynInst. Those tools deploy recursive descent strategies to
disassemble the binary code and to partition it into function
bodies. In other words, they assign code to functions and
reconstruct their CFGs based on the observed direct con-
trol flow transfers between them. Fine-grained code layout
randomization does not hamper that partitioning at all.
Moreover, the extra branches and possibly worse instruction
cache behavior following from fine-grained layout random-
ization can severely impact performance. When applied in
isolation, fine-grained randomization below the function
level is therefore costly but hardly useful.
When the randomization is combined with obfuscations
that break the recursive descent strategy of the disassembler,
more fine-grained randomization can still be useful, how-
ever. In that case, splitting up function bodies and placing
the parts in a randomized order prevents the tools from
deploying linear sweep strategies to make up for the then
defunct recursive descent strategy. How to do so is precisely
the aim of the obfuscations discussed next.
4 INTERPROCEDURAL OPAQUE PREDICATES
4.1 Disassembler Function Reconstruction Thwarting
To thwart the strategy of partitioning disassembled instruc-
tion sequences into functions based on direct control flow
transfers, we have two options. First, we can replace direct
transfers with indirect ones, such as branch functions [10], to
prevent that the disassembler infers that two code fragments
relate and belong in the same function. Note that this goal of
thwarting the disassembler’s function CFG reconstruction
after bytes have already been disassembled into instructions
is complementary to the original goal of branch functions,
which was to thwart the disassemblers’ ability to identify
the locations of instruction bytes in the executables, which
is known to be a difficult task [16].
Secondly, we can add “fake” direct transfers that trigger
incorrect assignments of basic blocks to functions. Such
transfers can be added easily by means of opaque predicates
and corresponding conditional branches. If we choose the
predicate of the conditional branch to opaquely evaluate to
false, implying that the branch will never be taken, we can
simply choose any point in the program as the target of the
conditional branch, thus injecting branch-taken CFG edges
between completely unrelated code fragments. If we choose
the predicate to opaquely evaluate to true, we can inject fall-
trough CFG edges between code fragments from completely
unrelated functions. This is trivial with the already existing
support for code layout randomization.
Importantly, whereas choosing the targets of the fake
edges is to be done at link-time when all linked-in code is
available, the actual injection of opaque predicates does not
necessarily need to occur at link time. Source-level obfus-
cators or obfuscating compilers can be used for the latter
as well. They can typically inject more complex opaque
predicates, which are then integrated in the original code
more stealthily as they are compiled together with the
original source code as long as they can inform the link-time
rewriter about the location of the opaque predicates in the
code. Obfuscating compilers can do so by adding comments
and mapping symbols to the generated assembly code or
object code, source-level obfuscators can do so by describing
the locations of inserted opaque predicate code in terms of
source line numbers. By means of debug information in the
object files, a link-time rewriter can then translate the source
line numbers to object code addresses, thus identifying the
locations where fake edges can be redirected to unrelated
fragments at link time.
Fake CFG edges confuse the disassembler tools’ CFG
construction algorithms because their recursive descent
strategies are implemented greedily: starting from function
entry points (identified through symbol information or pat-
tern matching), they traverse the code and greedily assign
traversed fragments to functions. During the traversal, they
5treat idioms for intraprocedural control flow, such as con-
ditional branches, as precisely that: intraprocedural control
flow. For unobfuscated compiled code, this works fine,
because few if any source languages feature interprocedural
gotos, and standard compilers don’t insert interprocedural
branches (with the rare exception of tail call optimization).
But without more complex data flow analysis or other
mechanisms to distinguish real from fake direct edges out of
conditional branches, the greedy strategies fail. Depending
on whether a basic block is first reached through a fake or
a true edge, it will be assigned to the correct or incorrect
function body. This implies that we can try to steer the
tools towards incorrect function partitioning and CFG re-
construction by inserting fake edges in a controlled manner,
but it also implies that the result of the reconstruction and
partitioning will depend on the order in which basic blocks
are traversed by the tools. In that regard, we observed that
tools like IDA Pro and Binary Ninja tend to give fall-through
paths precedence over branch-taken paths.
It is important to note that tools like IDA Pro offer
different views on the CFGs to human attackers on the one
hand, and to analysis tools on the other. In CFGs stored in
a database in support of plugins and external analysis tools,
IDA Pro stores all direct CFG edges it has discovered during
the disassembly process. This includes all edges from direct
transfers such as both paths out of conditional branches.
This database hence includes the mentioned fake edges,
which can be considered false positives (FPs). The IDA Pro
GUI, which is typically used by humans to study code,
however, does not display all such edges. Instead, it omits
such edges if they are interprocedural according to IDA Pro,
meaning that they connect basic blocks IDA Pro has put in
different functions. So attackers manually browsing through
CFGs in the tool’s GUI don’t get to see them. When fake
edges are (accidentally) omitted that way, we can consider
them as semi-true negatives (STNs): They are FPs in the
database view, but true negatives (TNs) in the GUI view.
When true edges are omitted as a result in the GUI, they
correspond to semi-false negatives (SFNs): they are TPs in
the database, but false negatives (FNs) in the GUI view.
SFN and STN CFG edges hamper manual code com-
prehension and code browsing activities on the GUI, as
they result in code from different components, such as
protections and original application code, being presented
as if it is part of the same functions, and code originating
from the same functions not being displayed as such. By
inserting such edges, we can contribute to a much more
stealthy integration of protection components.
4.2 Resilience against Counterattacks
So far, we only discussed the potency of code layout
randomization and interprocedural opaque predicates to
confuse attackers and tools. Another important aspect is
resilience to attacks, because attackers can of course still
deploy all kinds of automated attacks to make up for the
deficiencies of the existing, basic CFG partitioning strategy.
These include static attacks such as pattern matching [17],
abstract interpretation [18], and symbolic execution [19]
to detect opaque predicates, and dynamic attacks such as
generic deobfuscation [20] and fuzzing [21]. The dynamic
ones are not sound, but that typically does not hamper
attackers.
A first, critical point to make is that none of the men-
tioned static techniques have been scientifically validated as
successfully breaking complex forms of opaque predicates
(such as the graph-based ones from Collberg et al. [22])
on software of real-world complexity. Symbolic execution,
for example, was only tested on programs of at most two
functions [19]. Abstract interpretation was only evaluated
on opaque predicates of which the program slice (i.e., the
code computing the predicate) consisted of a tiny fragment
immediately preceding the conditional branch [18].
In practice, we have observed that both pattern match-
ing and local symbolic execution are effective attack tech-
niques [1]. In both cases, small slices of the predicates used
in conditional branches are then analyzed to determine
whether or not they (likely or definitely) correspond to
opaque predicates. Depending on the size of the software
under attack and the immediate availability of a working
attack tool box, attackers perform this analysis manually
or by means of tool plug-ins that automate the analysis.
Less skilled attackers reuse existing plug-ins as is, expert
attackers can also customize plug-ins. On small software,
attackers prefer manual analysis when they assess that
the cost of setting up and customizing the tools will not
be worthwhile. As completely manual analysis does not
scale to larger software with many predicate instances to
analyze, automation is typically preferred for attacks on
larger software. That automation also often requires manual
effort, however, if only because the customization of plug-
ins requires the attacker to first determine which forms of
opaque predicates are useful to search for, i.e., which code
patterns to try to support.
At first sight, the attacker’s ability to perform these
attacks seems not hampered by the interprocedural nature
of the opaque predicates we propose to inject. After all, the
interprocedural aspect only directly impacts the control flow
from the conditional branch on, not the code computing the
predicate leading up to the conditional branch.
However, by carefully choosing the targets of the fake
edges, we can directly impact the code slices of the opaque
predicates, or at least the perception thereof by the attacker.
We can in fact do so trivially by interrupting a slice of
one opaque predicate by means of a fake edge coming
in from another one. In the best case, this results in the
assembler mistakenly assigning the instructions computing
the predicate to multiple functions. In that case, the GUI will
not show all relevant instructions in one function CFG. This
will certainly hamper all manual activities of the attacker
as discussed above. But even if the whole slice is assigned
to the same function and hence shown on screen with the
correct control flow between the relevant instructions, the
attacker will still to some extent be confused when the fake
edge is drawn as well.
To overcome this confusion, how small or big it may be
in practice, the attacker has to consider multiple instances
of opaque predicates together. Consider the example in
Figure 1 with predicates of contrived simplicity. Fake edges
are drawn dotted, but at first, the attacker does not know
they are fake. To learn that they are truly fake, the attacker
needs to consider both fragments. In practice, we are not
6a = a + 1
a = 0
if (a == 0)
b = b + 1
b = 0
if (b == 0)
Fig. 1: Example of coupled opaque predicates
limited to coupling pairs of opaque predicates mutually,
we can easily couple more in larger cycles. A local code
comprehension task for the attacker then becomes a global
one; the effort needed to undo the protection grows.
A similar reasoning holds for fully automated analyses.
Had the opaque predicates not been mutually coupled in the
example of Figure 1, a simple constant propagation, applied
locally and iteratively with unreachable code elimination,
would have sufficed to detect them. In the coupled case,
simple constant propagation no longer suffices. Instead, a
more complex conditional constant propagation [23] is now
required. In general, the (mutual) coupling of opaque pred-
icates by letting fake edges interrupt slices implies that
path-sensitive versions of analyses are needed. If those are
applied locally, i.e., one slice at a time, they can suffice
to identify likely opaque predicates, i.e., predicates that
evaluate to constants on some execution paths. In that case,
the necessary increase in complexity of the attack step is
rather limited. If the attacker wants to deploy a sound(ish)
analysis, however, to get a degree of certainty about the
opaque predicates, the analysis has to be performed on
all mutually coupled fragments together. This implies a
considerable increase in complexity.
In summary, we can conclude that the resilience of code
layout randomization and interprocedural opaque predi-
cates, i.e., the effort needed to minimize their potency, with
respect to attacks of which we know they are used in
practice, is improved by coupling them in the proposed way.
Admittedly, this security analysis is fuzzy rather than
well-defined. We consider a formal analysis out of reach at
this point in time, not only for the protections against MATE
attacks presented in this technical report, but for most if not
all MATE protections. In Section 6, we will perform a quan-
titative evaluation of a prototype implementation in which
we mimick some real-life attacks. We will also provide
an extensive sensitivity analysis on the parameters of our
obfuscator tool that steer how the proposed protections are
applied.
Finally, we acknowledge that because it only injects in-
variant behavior into the software, the proposed protection
via mutually coupled opaque predicates and code layout
randomization does not protect in any way against dynamic
attacks such as the tracing-based generic deobfuscation.
While we deem this acceptable, as other protections can be
used to shield of dynamic attacks, such as anti-debugging,
anti-emulation, and anti-taint protections, we will still build
Context 1+2
Context 2Context 1Context 2Context 1
B
A
C
Dispatcher
(next)
B
Next = B
A
C
E
D
G
E
Next = E
D
F
F
G Next = F
Fig. 2: Control flow flattening
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C
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Fig. 3: Branch function
on the protections presented so far in the next section to also
make some dynamic attacks less effective.
5 CODE FACTORING
To prevent that some of the stronger attacks can reconstruct
the CFGs of a program’s functions completely by identifying
fake edges that can never be executed, we need to insert
control flow transfers with more than one true outgoing
edge. In line with what we discussed in Section 2, those
true outgoing edges should look like intraprocedural edges.
In other words, intraprocedural control flow transfer idioms
should be used in general. In order to thwart the partition-
ing of code into functions, however, the edges should be
interprocedural, connecting code from diffferent functions.
We can meet these requirements by deploying control
flow flattening [24] and branch functions [10] across multi-
ple functions. Both control flow obfuscations can be imple-
mented with many forms of intraprocedural looking control
flow transfers such as conditional branches, switch tables,
and computed jumps. Some simple examples are depicted
in Figure 2 and Figure 3. However, in that case the transfers
can still be observed to be semantically irrelevant: In a
program trace, their executions will never depend on actual
input values, only on constants such as those assigned to
next in Figure 2 and param in Figure 3. Furthermore,
apart from steering control to the appropriate continuation
points depending on how they are reached, the injected
code fragments then do not contribute to the output of
the program. For both reasons, these fragments will get de-
obfuscated by the approach of Yadegari et al. [20].
To counter this, we propose to combine the mentioned
obfuscations with code factoring, as illustrated in Figure 4.
7Context 1+2
Context 2Context 1Context 2Context 1
B
A
C
BE
B2
B1
A
C
E
D
F E2
E1
D
F
dispatcher
Fig. 4: Code factoring for obfuscation
Blocks B and E are identical in the original code. If both of
them can actually be executed in the original program, both
edges coming out of the factored block BE will be executable
in the transformed program. So the transfer at the end of
block BE will show variable behavior. Moreover, the code in
BE will be executed on data from two different contexts, and
hence also display variable behavior. Moreover, as the origi-
nal fragments B and E mattered for the original program, we
can assume the factored block BE to be semantically relevant
in the transformed program. The generic de-obfuscation
approach of Yadegari et al. will therefore fail.
Code factoring is not new. Several forms have been
proposed in the past to compact programs [12]. Our de-
ployment of factoring serves the purpose of obfuscation,
however, so it differs in two significant ways from previous
deployments. First, we do not factor code into new functions
that get called and end with return instructions. Instead,
we use idioms of intraprocedural control flow, such as
conditional branches, switch tables, and computed jumps.
Secondly, we do not strive for more compact code. This
implies that we can transform non-identical code fragments
to make them identical, even when that involves prepending
or appending extra instructions to the original fragments
that move values between registers.
With these different requirements, we developed a sig-
nificantly different code factoring technique. The most rele-
vant aspects are a fast preliminary identification of potential
fragments to be factored, the identification of actual factor-
ing candidates, the order in which those are selected for
transformation, the preparation of the selected ones, and the
actual factoring transformations themselves.
5.1 Potential Factoring Candidates
To factor code, identical code fragments need to be iden-
tified or created. Existing factoring techniques [25], [26],
[11] pre-partition code fragments using fingerprints. The
fingerprinting functions are simple and strike a balance
between recall and precision: They are defined such that
code fragments that are “similar enough” to be likely can-
didates for factoring are mapped onto the same fingerprint.
Much more complex and time-consuming precise checks of
factoring pre-conditions, which also analyse the fragments’
surroudings, are only performed on sets of fragments within
the same partition, i.e., with the same fingerprint.
In existing code factoring techniques focussing on com-
paction, “similar enough” is defined as “nearly identical”,
i.e., having identical instruction schedules, and (almost)
identical register allocations. The underlying assumption
is that less similar fragments might well be factorable,
but likely glue code will have to be injected around them
before they can be factored, which will likely undo the
compaction gains. Furthermore, to further limit the search
space by focusing on worthwhile cases, existing techniques
typically consider fragments consisting of one or more
basic blocks, such as whole single basic blocks, single-
entry CFG subgraphs of multiple blocks, and whole func-
tions/methods [27], [12], [28], [29], [30]. An underlying
assumption is that it is much less likely to find nearly
identical, worthwhile fragments inside single basic blocks
if the containing blocks are not nearly identical as a whole.
For our obfuscation purpose, the size of the glue code is
only a secondary concern. We hence have to strike a balance
differently. We opted to do so by not factoring fragments
consisting of one or more whole basic blocks. Instead we
focus on slices (as defined by Horwitz [31]) and instruction
sequences that are limited to, i.e., originate from within,
single basic blocks. We only consider slices and sequences
that exclude control flow transfer instructions.
The slices we consider as candidates for factoring are
directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) with a single sink node.
The DAGs’ nodes are instructions and their edges are
data dependencies. Instructions can define multiple slices,
ranging from the single-instruction slice consisting of only
the instruction itself, to the largest possible incoming data-
dependency DAG within the instruction’s basic block. Be-
sides in the slices they define themselves, instructions can
also show up in the slices defined on instructions further
down in their basic blocks. The sequences we consider are
sequences of instructions in the order in which they occur
in the basic blocks. All subsequences of the instruction
sequence constituting the block are considered. In the re-
mainder of this technical report, we use the term fragments
to denote both slice and sequences. They are treated mostly
identically in our factoring approach.
The only point where their treatment differs is in the
computation of fingerprints. For sequences, we iterate over
the instructions in their order in the original program.
For slices, we iterate over the instructions in a canonical
order that abstracts from the precise order in which the
instructions occur in the program. This canonicalization is
useful because nodes in a DAG are only partially ordered,
and compilers generate different instruction orders for the
same DAGs depending on the other instructions mixed in
between them.
The fingerprints consist of the concatenation of at
most four instructions’ opcode (e.g., ADD, MOV, ...), their
operand types (e.g., two registers, one register and an
immediate, ...) and some of their flags (e.g., pre- or post
indexed). We found that including only four instructions
in the fingerprint strikes a good balance between precision,
recall, and memory consumption.
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ments, i.e., their contribution to the total execution time of a
program as determined with profiling. Excluding the hottest
fragments helps to reduce the performance overhead.
5.2 Actual Factoring Candidates
Being nearly identical does not suffice for actual factoring.
For sets of nearly identical fragments, we also need (i) to
extract the fragments from their basic blocks; (ii) to make
fragments truly identical by reallocating registers and by
replacing non-identical immediate operands by constants
stored in registers; (iii) to add a dispatcher to “return” from
the factored fragment and to feed that dispatcher with the
necessary inputs at each “call site”. The latter two result
in increased register pressure. Our binary rewriter does not
convert the higher-level executable code to a higher level
IR. Hence we need to transform the code and handle the
register pressure locally. Concretely, this means we have to
inject glue code in the form of register transfer instructions
such as move, copy, swap, and spills to memory around
the fragments. Foremost, we need to check whether we can
actually perform the required rewriting within the capabil-
ities (available transformations and analysis precision) of
the link-time rewriter. As different dispatchers come with
slightly different requirements, we also need to check which
dispatchers can be used for which sets.
Figures 5, 6, and 7 illustrate the required transformations
with 32-bit ARMv8 code. The selected slices are marked in
bold in Figure 5. They have been rescheduled into separate
blocks in Figure 6. To enable the factoring already applied in
Figure 7, the differences in immediate operands and register
allocations have been overcome by inserting a number of
move and swap operations in blocks 1b, 2a, and 2b. The
dispatcher in block 3b is a simple conditional branch. In
the first instruction of block 2a, the controlling register r9
is set to zero, to control and enable the execution path 2a-
3a-3b-2b. For controlling and enabling the path 1a-1b-3a-3b-
1c, register r9 does not need to be set to a specific value.
Instead, the fact that r9 is used as a base address in the store
preceding slice 1 is relied upon: as user applications have
no data mapped onto the lowest page in virtual memory,
we can assume that r9 will be non-zero in the code following
the store. This assumption is optional and can easily omitted
in scenarios where it would not hold, such as kernel code.
To test whether sufficient glue code can be generated
to make a fragment set actually factorable, we use a bi-
directional, context-sensitive interprocedural liveness anal-
ysis [32]. To identify already available constants as input to
dispatchers, we perform a flow-sensitive, context-sensitive
(k-depth with k=1) constant propagation analysis [33]. On
top, we developed a simple flow-sensitive, context-sensitive
(k-depth with k=1), bidirectional, interprocedural non-zero
analysis that tracks which registers hold values that are
definitely non-zero. As these data flow analyses operate at
the level of executable code, where useful alias information
is sparse [34], they only analyze data in registers.
The constant analysis and the non-zero analysis allow
us to reuse values that already have semantic relevance in
the original program to control the dispatcher. If, for some
factored fragment, this is the case for more than one of the
STR r4, [r9, #0x4]
LDR r4, [r13, #0x48]
ADD r7, r7, #0x8
LDR r5, [r13, #0x28]
CMP r7, r4
ADD r12, r5, #0x8
STR r12, [r13, #0x28]
MOV r7, r5
BNE (…)
LDR r7, [r13, #0x88]
LDR r8, [r13, #0x70]
CMP r12, r7
ADD r8, r8, #0x1
STR r8, [r13, #0x70]
BGE (…)
1
2
Fig. 5: Factoring candidate slices in bold in their respective
basic blocks
ADD r7, r7, #0x8
CMP r7, r4
MOV r7, r5
BNE (…)
CMP r12, r7
BGE (…)
LDR r4, [r13, #0x48]
LDR r5, [r13, #0x28]
ADD r12, r5, #0x8
STR r12, [r13, #0x28]
LDR r7, [r13, #0x88]
LDR r8, [r13, #0x70]
ADD r8, r8, #0x1
STR r8, [r13, #0x70]
1a 2a
1b 2b
STR r4, [r9, #0x4]
Fig. 6: Split factoring candidate slices
contexts from which the factored fragment was extracted,
the dispatcher is then controlled by semantically relevant
data originating from more than one execution context. The
invariants that held in those original contexts in isolation
likely do not hold in the merged context after factoring. We
conjecture that this makes code comprehension harder. It
also ensures that de-obfuscation techniques based on (quasi-
)invariants will not work on the factored code.
In the example, slice 2’s registers were renamed to those
of slice 1. In many cases, candidate sets consist of more
than 2 slices. Trying out all possible register renamings to
select the best one would increase the code analysis time
significantly, so instead we use a simple heuristic to select
one of the slices as reference slice to which the others are
renamed. This simple heuristic in practice also favors more
likely successful renamings over less likely successful ones.
In slice 1 of the example, the value loaded into r5 by the
second load is live-out. In slice 2, the value loaded into r8
by the corresponding load is overwritten by the add. So an
allocation like that of slice 2 cannot replace that of slice 1.
In our simple heuristic, we count the number of different
registers occurring in the original fragments, and we pick
the one with the highest number as reference fragment. In
case the heuristic does not favor one fragment over the oth-
ers, and when (optional) profiling information is available,
we pick the fragment with the highest execution count as
reference fragment.While these simple heuristics are clearly
not optimal, they provide a good balance between analysis
time, performance and size overhead, and success ratio of
the transformations.
5.3 Selection Order
Instructions can be present in multiple factoring candidate
sets, but each instruction can only be factored once. Fur-
9ADD r7, r7, #0x8
CMP r7, r4
MOV r7, r5
BNE (…)
CMP r12, r7
BGE (…)
CMP r9, #0x0
BEQ (2b)
MOV r9, #0x0
MOV r14, #0x70
MOV r11, #0x1
MOV r10, #0x88
MOV r7, r12
B (…)
SWAP r7, r4
SWAP r8, r12
SWAP r12, r4
LDR r4, [r13, r10]
LDR r5, [r13, r14]
ADD r12, r5, r11
STR r12, [r13, r14]
MOV r14, #0x28
MOV r11, #0x8
MOV r10, #0x48
B (…)
1c
2c
1b
2a
2b
3a
STR r4, [r9, #0x4]1a
3b
Fig. 7: Factored slices
thermore, factoring a set of fragments changes the data
flow properties in the surrounding code, e.g., by making
previously dead registers containing non-zero or constant
data live, so one factoring can impact the potential of
another candidate one. The order in which we select and
apply actual factorings is therefore important.
The selection order also needs to strike a balance be-
tween the level of protection and obfuscation speed. The for-
mer requires a global optimization and decision process that
considers all potential candidate sets. However, that would
require too much computation time. The potential candi-
date sets can be very large, up to hundreds of fragments,
especially for small fragments of one or two instructions.
The larger subsets thereof are typically not actual factoring
candidates because our local register renaming technique
is not powerful enough to overcome the differences in
data flow properties of all the fragments surroundings. For
smaller candidate subsets, the renaming is much more likely
to succeed. Our approach hence starts from small candidate
sets, that we expand as much as possible, i.e., as long as the
estimated protection value increases.
5.3.1 Priority Function
To order and compare candidate sets in terms of protection
value, we need to consider measurable features (i.e., met-
rics) that contribute to the potency, resilience, and stealth of
factoring them. We propose the following ones:
1) the fragment size as their number of instructions;
2) the numbers of archives, object files, and functions
from which the fragments come;
3) the numbers of archives, object files, and functions
in which fragments were observed to be executed
for at least one input, as determined by (optionally)
profiling or fuzzing;
4) the possible dispatchers, and, if applicable, the al-
ready available constants or non-zero values.
The first metric prioritizes larger code fragments over
smaller ones. We conjecture this is useful because factoring
larger fragments results in more semantics being merged
from different contexts, thus increasing the potency of a
factoring transformation. It can also be useful for stealth,
as it allows for better mixing of the injected dispatcher
code with the factored code. Finally, it can contribute to the
resilience against certain attacks. For example, undoing a
factoring transformation by statically rewriting the code is
more difficult when more instructions need to be re-inserted
in the contexts from which they were factored.
The second metric, which actually consists of three
metrics, contributes to potency. Assigning higher value to
factorings of unrelated fragments originating from multi-
ple object archives, object files, or functions, allows us to
prioritize candidate sets that break proximity-based attack
heuristics and that obfuscate component boundaries.
The third metric, again a set of three metrics, relates to re-
silience against dynamic attacks that build on observations
of executions of the software under attack. These metrics
allow us to prioritize candidate sets of which the effect of
factoring them on the reconstructed CFGs cannot be undone
by omitting edges and nodes that the attacker cannot trigger
during dynamic attacks and by then simplifying the remain-
ing code, as is done in the generic de-obfuscation attack by
Yadegari et al. [20].
The fourth metric allows to consider the potency, re-
silience, and stealth of the different types of dispatchers:
some are harder to analyze but not very stealthy (e.g.,
dynamic switch dispatchers), others are stealthy in the
sense that they ressemble already occuring fragments in the
original programs (e.g., conditional jumps). Some are more
resilient to automatic de-obfuscation, others are less so. The
different dispatchers are discussed in Section 5.4.
The metrics can be combined in a priority function in
various ways: in weighted sums, in decision trees, etc.
They can also be combined with profile information to give
lower priority to fragments on frequently executed code
paths to minimize the performance impact of the factorings.
The definition of the best priority function is out of the
scope of this technical report. Importantly, a user of our
protection tool chain can customize it depending on his use
case at hand, taking into account the security requirements
of the software assets at hand (confidentiallity, integrity,
...), a risk assessment of different attack scenarios, and the
performance budget.
5.3.2 Selection and Actual Factoring
Our factoring algorithm consists of two phases.
At the start of the selection phase, we perform the already
mentioned data flow analyses. Then a list of initial factoring
candidates is assembled, ordered by their protection value.
This list includes sets of fragments that are actual factoring
candidates in the untransformed program. In other words,
the data flow properties of the original program meet the
necessary pre-conditions to apply the factoring transforma-
tions. No factorings are applied yet, however.
To decide on the initial candidate sets to add to the list in
the selection phase, we implemented an iterative algorithm
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that is applied to each of the potential candidate sets. For
each such set, the algorithm starts by marking pairs of
fragments that can be factored, i.e., pairs for which register
renaming can be performed and at least one dispatcher can
be generated. Using the priority function to sort all possible
pairs in terms of protection value, we select the best starting
pair as the seed set. Next, we iteratively try to expand the
seed set. In each iteration, we add the one fragment from the
potential candidate set that results in the biggest increase in
protection value. This continues as long as the protection
value increases. The final expanded set is then added to
the list of actual factoring candidates, in which we also
keep track of the possible dispatchers, available constants
or non-zero values, and other useful information to steer the
dispatcher. The fragments in the expanded set are removed
from the potential candidate set, and the whole process is
repeated with other seeds until no sufficiently valuable seed
sets can be found anymore.
In the factoring phase, we iterate over the ordered list
of actual factoring candidate sets in decreaseing priority.
We factor each set if the necessary pre-conditions have not
been invalidated by a previously applied factoring. Our
prototype implementation can be configured on how to
choose specific dispatchers from the available ones for each
factoring, such as randomly or giving priority to specific
forms. After each factoring, we update data flow informa-
tion by means of incremental versions of the mentioned
analyses to propagate the impact of the performed factoring
on available registers, constants, and non-zero values to the
necessary program locations.
5.4 Dispatchers
Many different dispatchers can be designed. We developed
support for four types.
5.4.1 Conditional jump dispatcher
For sets of two fragments, a simple conditional branch can
serve as dispatcher, as in Figure 7. A branch condition like
equal-to-zero can be steered with a zero and an unknown
non-zero value that already has a semantic role in the origi-
nal program. If no constants or non-zero values are available
at the program locations of the original fragments, glue
code is injected to produce them, possibly in an obfuscated
manner and hoisted in the code such that a local static
analysis does not suffice to detect it. We will come back
to this in Section 5.5. Moreover, there is no need to keep
it in a register, it can also be stored in memory. All kinds
of schemes can be imagined that opaquely produce or load
specific constant values or other values, always negative or
always positive values, etc.
These dispatchers offer the major advantage that disas-
semblers like IDA Pro will recognize them as intraprocedu-
ral control flow, and thus we can rely on them to steer IDA
Pro towards incorrect partitioning of code into functions.
In terms of preconditions, it is important to note that
this type of dispatcher sets the processor’s status flags. If
those were live-out in the original fragments, it means the
status bits have to be saved somehow, either in registers
or by spilling them to memory. Saving and spilling status
flags is rarely done in compiler-generated code, however, so
when it occurs, it makes the code immediately suspicious in
the eyes of attackers. For that reason, we opted not to use
this type of dispatcher when the status flags are live-out in
any of the involved fragments. Whether or not this is the
best choice under all circumstances admittedly is open for
debate.
For sets of more fragments, trees of multiple conditional
branches can be used, but our prototype implementation is
currently limited to single branches that are fed data (zeroes
and non-zero values) directly through registers.
5.4.2 Indirect branch dispatcher
For larger fragment sets, we can use branch-to-register dis-
patchers, similar to the branch functions of Linn et al [10].
In the simplest implementation, the exact addresses of the
destination blocks are produced in the glue code preceding
the extracted fragments, but less manifest schemes can
easily be constructed.
Very simple schemes in which addresses are produced
directly and locally, i.e., in glue code immediately preceding
the transfer to the factored fragment, are not resilient to
even relatively simple static analysis. For example, IDA
Pro out-of-the-box identifies directly produced addresses
during its recursive disassembly process and continues
disassembling at those addresses. If the bytes at those
addresses correspond to valid instruction encodings, IDA
Pro adds the code at those addresses to CFGs, albeit in
separate functions to which it does not create edges from
the dispatcher. Complex schemes in which addresses are
computed right before the branch-to-register instruction can
be made completely resilient against static analysis and even
the generic de-obfuscation of Debray et al., but they come
with the disadvantage that they are not at all stealthy. For
example, it happens pretty rarely that values are XOR-ed
before serving as a branch target, so schemes based on XOR-
ing can be targeted with pattern matchers.
Unlike conditional jump dispatchers, IDA Pro does not
add outgoing edges to this type of dispatcher. So while it
can be used to prevent the tool from constructing complete
function CFGs out of the box, it cannot, by itself, steer IDA
Pro towards incorrect CFGs that incorporate basic blocks
from multiple, unrelated functions. As we will discuss in
Section 5.5, we can combine this type of dispatcher with
other obfuscation constructs to reach exactly that.
In our prototype obfuscator, we only implemented sup-
port for schemes with direct address production in a dead
register in the glue code preceding the factored fragments.
5.4.3 Static switch table dispatcher
Whereas computed jumps occur rarely in compiled C and
C++ code, indirect jumps via table look-ups occur regularly,
because switch statements are typically compiled into such
look-ups. Two variations exist: address tables and branch
tables. In the former the address of the case to be executed is
loaded from a table and jumped to, in the latter a computed
jump is performed into a table of branches, which then
forwards control to the case to be executed. Before the look-
up, a bounds check is often performed. If it fails, control is
transferred to the default case.
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Table-based dispatchers mimicking switch dispatchers
are therefore more stealthy than branch-function-like dis-
patchers. With this type of dispatcher, the glue code before
factored fragments passes indexes to the dispatcher. These
can again be produced directly or in some obfuscated way,
and either locally or hoisted. Indexes can also be derived
from known constants already in registers in the original
code upon entry to the factored fragment.
The tables can be inflated with fake target addresses or
jumps to fake targets. Tools like IDA Pro handle many pat-
terns of switch table implementations and implicitly assume
that the dispatchers implement intraprocedural transfers, so
by implementing this dispatcher in a suitable pattern, IDA
Pro can be steered towards creating many fake edges that
result in incorrect CFG partitioning of the code. Disassem-
blers will typically also use the bounds check to determine
the size of the table, so by inserting a fake bounds check,
they can be fooled also in that regard.
In our prototype tool, we implemented support for both
forms of tables. The tool inserts (fake) bounds checks if
the condition registers are available. If not, there simply is
no bounds check inserted. In that case, tools like IDA Pro
typically do not analyze the switch statement and the table,
and simply do not add outgoing edges at all.
Finally, we need to note that whereas look-up based
indirect control flow transfers are more stealthy than
computation-based indirect transfers, their use for factoring
can still lack stealthyness, in particular for large fragment
sets. This is of course the case because in non-obfuscated
and hence well-structured code, switch statements typically
have a low fan-in. Our factored fragments, however, have a
fan-in equal to their (true) fan-out. High fan-ins are suspi-
cious in the eyes of attackers.
The strength of this form of factoring therefore has to
come from its improved potency and resilience. The potency
can be improved by combining this factoring with other
obfuscations, as we will discuss in Section 5.5.
5.4.4 Dynamic switch table dispatcher
To improve both the potency of look-up-based dispatchers
and their resilience against static analyses, we propose to
make the look-up tables dynamic rather than static.
In compiled code, there is a static one-to-one mapping
of dispatchers to tables. We are not bound by this restric-
tion, however, and can let dispatchers dynamically switch
between multiple tables. To that extent, we designed and
implemented what we call dynamic switch tables. Given a set
of global data tables, one such dispatcher may address any
of these tables during the execution of the program. The
key idea is to separate data table selection from its usage,
both spatially and temporally. We do this by introducing
so-called table selection points in the CFG: locations where
we insert a small instruction sequence to select one of the
global data tables. We store the base address of the selected
data table in a global variable used by the dispatcher. By
separating the selection and use of the tables, a single dy-
namic switch table dispatcher may address different global
data tables at different times during a single run.
Figure 8 shows the example factoring of two fragments
B and E. The end result is shown on the right: three table
selection points, the factored block BE, a dynamic switch
CODE
B
A
C
BE
index=m
A
C
E
D
F
index=n
D
F
Dispatcher
x[index]
xT1 xT2
xT3
... ...
DATA
m:
...
F
T3:
...
n:
...
C
T2:
D
n:
...
C
...
T1:
x:
...
m:
Fig. 8: Transformation with dynamic switch tables
table dispatcher, its global variable (x), and data tables T1,
T2 and T3. The glue code with the transfers to the factored
block only contains instructions to produce the switch in-
dices for each control flow path (m for fragment A and n for
fragment B). The location where x gets assigned a new value
does not really matter; the distance between the dispatcher
and the table selection points can be arbitrarily large. Using
a reachability analysis, the obfuscator determines which
table selections reach which assigments of switch indices.
In the example, selections of T1 and T2 reach the point
where the index is set to m. This leads to the constraint that
T1[m]=T2[m]=C. The tables need to be filled in respecting
all such constraints. Similar to static switch tables, we can
also add false entries (e.g., at index m in table T2) to confuse
the attacker and his tools.
Compared to static switch table dispatchers, dynamic
table dispatchers increase the complexity by introducing
an extra layer of indirection, which known static analy-
sis cannot resolve, in particular when multiple obfusca-
tions get combined, as will be discussed in Section 5.5.
We also observed that these dispatchers mislead IDA Pro
into constructing incomplete CFGs, because it is incapable
of analysing them properly. Consequently, the recursive-
descent disassembler does not always disassemble all the
instructions in the binary and associations between (some-
times large) portions of code are lost. The potency and
resilience of this dispatcher are thus high. By contrast, this
dispatcher is not stealthy: An attacker may find it strange
that a dispatcher exists with no detected outgoing control
flow. Given the high potency and resilience, we believe this
lack of stealthiness does not completely void its usefulness.
The preconditions for this dispatcher are identical to
the ones for traditional switch-based dispatchers, with the
additional requirement that one extra register needs to be
available to store a temporary value in.
5.5 Integration with other protections
A potential weak point of the factoring is that the compu-
tation of the values controlling the dispatchers (such as the
index into a table, or a zero constant) is done in a linear
control flow path leading up to the transfers to the factored
code. We can fall back to all kinds of existing obfuscations
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to obfuscate this calculation, but the level of obfuscation is
limited by the performance budget.
Complementary, e.g., to light-weight obfuscation, we
can increase the potency and resilience of the proposed
techniques by coupling the factorings. We can couple them
with each other as well as with the opaque predicates.
In Section 4.2, we already discussed how multiple opaque
predicates can be coupled by directing fake edge to points in
the middle of (other) opaque predicate computations. Like-
wise, we can also redirect fake opaque predicate edges to
the middle of instruction sequences that compute dispatcher
control values. And we can choose the targets of fake entries
in the tables of switch-based dispatchers in exactly the same
way to obfuscate opaque predicate computations as well as
dispatcher controller computations. That way, we turn the
static analysis and deobfuscation of opaque predicates and
factoring into one global hurdle for attackers.
6 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
6.1 Prototype Implementation
We implemented the proposed techniques in the ASPIRE
Compiler Tool Chain (ACTC) [35], which can compose
multiple protections through source-to-source and binary
code rewriting. All proposed techniques are implemented
in Diablo [11], the ACTC’s link-time binary code rewriter.
The code is available as open source at https://github.com/
csl-ugent/diablo/tree/oisp.
Our prototype has limitations. The binary rewriter does
not support trees of conditional branch dispatchers, and
lacks global register allocation and the option to spill and
free status registers. Furthermore, the currently supported
opaque predicates are limited to algebraic ones. More com-
plex ones can be supported by combining the ACTC’s
source-to-source rewriting to inject complex predicates (e.g.,
graph-based ones [7] or predicates resilient to symbolic
execution [36]) with binary rewriting to let fake edges cross
component boundaries. Finally, the rewriter lacks support
for C++ exception handling.
6.2 Benchmarks
We have validated correctness on all C and C++ programs
from the SPEC CPU2006 benchmark suite [37] (excluding
453.povray and 471.omnetpp that depend on excep-
tion handling) and on two industrial use cases from the
ASPIRE research project [38]. Whereas the SPEC programs
are stand-alone Linux binaries, the industrial use cases
are dynamically linked Android libraries that are loaded
into third-party applications. Nagravision contributed the
first use case, a Digital Rights Management (DRM) plug-
in that is loaded into the Android DRM and mediaserver
daemon processes. SafeNet contributed the second use case,
a software license manager (SLM) that is loaded into the
Android Dalvik engine. Those daemons and engines are
complex third-party multi-threaded processes that load and
unload the libraries frequently. They hence stress-test our
prototype.
The ASPIRE project deployed and validated the many
ACTC-supported protections on those two use cases to
mitigate attacks on the assets embedded in them, in line
with the assets’ security requirements as formulated by the
security experts of the companies that contributed them [39].
As part of these protections, numerous archives are linked
into the libraries. The protected use cases thus form perfect
candidates to evaluate the proposed methods for stealthy,
obfuscated integration of components proposed in this tech-
nical report. Table 2 lists the deployed protections, and the
number of components linked into the libraries thereto.
In addition, we consider the SLM use case to consist of
three components itself (the manager and linked-in open-
source crypto and math libraries) and the DRM case of
two components (the manager and some linked-in libgcc.a
functionality). From the overall instruction count numbers
in Table 2, it is clear that our use cases are not micro-
benchmarks, but applications and libraries of real-world
complexity.
By contrast, the ACTC does not deploy additional
protection on the SPEC benchmarks, as those embed no
security-sensitive assets. Still, three of those benchmarks
have their source code split over multiple directories:
436.cactusADM, 445.gobmk, and 454.calculix. By
treating each directory as a separate archive, we can still
evaluate our techniques on them. Figure 9 plots the relative
sizes of the benchmarks’ components on the x-axis; the
y-axis is the code coverage in the different components
obtained when we profiled the benchmarks on our training
inputs. These data enable the interpretation of measurement
results below.
6.3 Applicability
First, we analyse the applicability of the different transfor-
mations. Code layout randomization is applicable every-
where trivially. Opaque predicates and related conditional
branches can also be inserted almost everywhere easily. In
our prototype obfuscator, the user can specify the proba-
bility with which an opaque predicate is injected into each
basic block. A pseudo-random process then chooses blocks
and opaque predicate constructs accordingly.
By contrast, the proposed factoring techniques are not
applicable trivially: factorable fragments need to be avail-
able, preferably over component boundaries. So first, we
measured the applicability of factoring. Figure 10 shows
the fraction of the original instructions that get factored
in five cases: when all four types of dispatchers (indirect
branches, switches, switches with dynamic tables, and con-
ditional jumps) are mixed with some randomization, and
when each of those four is deployed in isolation. In each
bar, the colored segments in the stack mark the number of
different archives from which the slices/sequences factored
together originate. The lowest segment corresponds to in-
structions that are factored from within only one archive.
The second to instructions that are factored from within two
archives etc. It is clear that a considerable fraction of all
instructions gets factored. It is also clear that the amounts of
instructions factored from within multiple archives clearly
correlates with the number of available archives and with
the uniformity with which the application is partitioned
into archives. Figures 11 and 12 similarly show that many
instructions are factored from within multiple object files
and multiple functions, at least for dispatchers that support
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TABLE 2: Number of components in the benchmarks
SLM DRM 436 445 454
Number of archives constituting benchmark (• in Figure 9) 3 2 17 7 5
ACTC protection archives linked into benchmark (◦ in Figure 9)
Call stack checks no support components linked-in 0 0
N/A
Code mobility libwebsockets, libcurl, libssl, libcrypto, implementation 5 5
Anti-debugging minidebugger 1 1
Code guards implementation and guards 1 1
Custom bytecode interpreter application-specific VM implementation 1 N/A
Overall component (=archive) count 11 9 17 7 5
Overall instruction count without our obfuscations 276k 255k 99k 152k 366k
0
20
40
60
80
100
0 5 10 15 20 25
% of original program
%
ex
ec
ut
ed
(a) 436.cactusADM (36.46%)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
% of original program
%
ex
ec
ut
ed
(b) 445.gobmk (61.03%)
0
20
40
60
80
100
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
% of original program
%
ex
ec
ut
ed
(c) 454.calculix (12.28%)
0
20
40
60
80
100
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
% of original program
%
ex
ec
ut
ed
(d) SLM (10.17%)
0
20
40
60
80
100
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
% of original program
%
ex
ec
ut
ed
(e) DRM (8.08%)
Fig. 9: Relative archive sizes and their individual coverage in the benchmarks, plus overall coverage per benchmark
slice sets with more than two slices. Also at those levels
of granularity, the factoring approach is hence capable of
obfuscating component boundaries.
In the context of dynamic attacks such as generic de-
obfuscation that focus on covered instructions with quasi-
invariant behavior, it is also useful to know how many
of the factored instructions were originally covered (i.e.,
executed) in one or more contexts. To that extent, Fig-
ure 13 shows the distributions of the factored instructions
in terms of the number of the covered slices/sequences
from which they were factored. Each segment marks the
fraction of all instructions that got factored in a set of
slices/sequences, where the number of slices/sequences
covered in the original program is indicated by the color
of the segment. This means that the lowest segment cor-
responds to the instructions that got factored in a set of
which no slice/sequence is covered in the original program.
The next segment to instructions that got factored in a set
in which one slice/sequence is covered, etc. The observed
distributions are in line with the data in Figure 9: When few
instructions are covered in the first place, even fewer get
factored from within one or more covered contexts.
Figure 14 shows similar data, but rather than considering
all instructions, it only considers the covered instructions
in the protected program, i.e., the instructions targeted by
dynamic attacks. From the overall height of the bars, it is
obvious that significant parts of the covered instructions
are factored. Moreover, the vast majority of the factored
covered instructions are factored from multiple covered
contexts. This implies that in the protected program, most
of the factored fragments are executed on data from two
contexts. This implies that the injected dispatchers for the
vast majority of the covered and factored slices do not
display quasi-invariant behavior.
Figures 15–19 presents a further dissection of the fac-
toring applicability. The heatmaps display the relations be-
tween the number of factored fragments in the protected
program (color), the sizes of the factored fragments (first x-
axis), the number of archives from which they are factored
(second x-axis), and the number of archives in which the
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factored fragments were covered (y-axis).
As to be expected, the number of factored shorter frag-
ments is significantly larger than that for longer ones. Sec-
ond, the longer factored fragments all come from within
a single archive. From further examination, we actually
observed that the exceptionally long fragments originate
from loop-unrolled code.
It is also clear that the most interesting factorizations, i.e.,
those from multiple contexts executed in multiple archives,
are relatively rare, and involve only rather short sequences.
This clearly indicates that there are practical limitations to
the level of protection that our techniques can provide. Still,
the colored cells in the upper right corner shows that even
if attackers completely neglect all uncovered control flow
edges and code fragments, some dispatchers that are exe-
cuted in more than one direction will keep hampering their
reconstruction of the original program. In future work, we
will investigate techniques to generate more and larger fac-
torizable fragments by transforming code fragments rather
than simply selecting existing ones like we do now.
6.4 Potency
To estimate the potency of the presented obfuscations, i.e.,
the extent to which they confuse human attackers, we
performed two measurements on binaries protected with
our Diablo-based tool. For these experiments, we config-
ured the tool as follows. For factoring, we enable all dis-
patchers (with switch tables filled with 30% fake entries)
and only factor fragments of at least 2 instructions but
with no other restrictions, e.g., regarding hotness. We insert
opaque predicates and corresponding conditional branches
into 20% of randomly selected basic blocks, making the fall-
through edge the fake edge whenever possible. After code
layout randomization, we redirect fake edges throughout
the binary to create cycles of four coupled obfuscations as
discussed in Section 4.2.
First, we measure the extent to which the code of
different components has become interconnected by intra-
procedural-looking edges. For each instruction, we count
from how many function entry points those instructions are
reachable through intraprocedural control flow idioms only
(i.e., through direct branches, fall throughs, switches, and
from call sites to their corresponding return addresses). We
then count from how many archives, objects, and functions
those entry points originate. This metric thus measures the
number of different components to which an attacker or
his tools can potentially assign each instruction, and from
which he has to make a choice to reconstruct the CFGs
correctly. For the SLM benchmark, Figure 20 shows the
results. For other benchmarks, the results are similar. Before
factoring, most code is reachable from a single function
entry point, as one expects for code written in C. The
few exceptions mainly originate from manually written and
optimized assembly functions in the linked-in crypto library.
After factoring, the vast majority of the code is reachable
from within a vast number of function entry points, that
originate from a large number of different object files, and
from all archives. The reason is that a large part of the
code ends up in one big intraprocedurally-single-connected
component in the combined CFGs of the program. So at
least in theory, our transformations succeed in obfuscating
the boundaries between components at the three levels of
granularity.
Secondly, we measure a practically oriented metric in the
form of the amount of incorrect information that the popular
reverse engineering tool IDA Pro (v.6.8) presents to the user
due to the obfuscations. Concretely, we measure the fraction
of fake CFG edges that IDA Pro stores in its database and/or
shows in its GUI, as well as the fraction of true CFG edges
that IDA Pro does not store and/or show. The former are FP
rates, the latter are FN rates.
It should be noted that IDA Pro is not designed for
reverse engineering obfuscated binaries. In particular, it is
not designed to handle basic blocks that are reachable via
intraprocedural control flow idioms from multiple function
entry points. It simply assigns basic blocks to functions
based on the order in which the recursive descent assembler
visits them, not based on heuristics that take into account
the effects of our transformations. IDA Pro can easily be
augmented by an attacker, however, as it exports the con-
structed CFGs in a database that attacker scripts can manip-
ulate. In other words, a skilled attacker can easily override
and extend the disassembler and function reconstruction
heuristics of IDA Pro.
To mimic skilled attackers, we experimented with vari-
ous algorithms to maximize the amount of code in a binary
that IDA Pro actually disassembles, as well as with various
heuristics that repartition the disassembled code fragments
(i.e., basic blocks) into functions such that the reconstructed
functions better ressemble the actual functions. We observed
that many similar algorithms yielded very similar results,
so the exact implementation details do not matter, as long
as they incorporate three main ideas. First, one should try
to put all identified code in functions, even if that code
was not identified as being reachable by the original IDA
Pro. This is the case, e.g., for code fragments that are only
reachable through switch tables that IDA Pro cannot analyse
precisely. Secondly, for such code fragments as well as for
code fragments that the original IDA Pro already did put
into functions, one should determine the function to which
the fragment is most connected through incoming and
outgoing intraprocedurally looking CFG edges in the IDA
Pro database, and then put the fragment in that function.
Finally, for determining the function to which a fragment is
most connected and in which it hence belongs, one should
assign different weights to different types of edges. Most
importantly, edges originating from indirect control flow
transfers such as those used to implement switches should
have lower weights that other direct control flow edges.
In addition, if the attacker knows somehow that the fake
edges in opaque predicates are mostly fall-through edges
or mostly taken edges, he can assign different weights
to those types of conditional branch edges as well. Our
code implementing these heuristics is available online at
https://github.com/csl-ugent/oisp.
Table 3 presents the measurement data for the SLM
benchmark, with Table 3a listing the compilation and link
flags used to generate the program, and Tables 3b to 3d
listing the results. Similar measurement data are available in
Table 4 for 436.cactusADM, Table 5 for 445.gobmk, Table 6
for 454.calculix and Table 7 for DRM. As the conclusions
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Fig. 10: Fraction of all instructions that get factored from within the indicated number of archives
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Fig. 11: Fraction of all instructions that get factored from within the indicated number of object files
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Fig. 12: Fraction of all instructions that get factored from within the indicated number of functions
are the same for all benchmarks, we only discuss the results
for the SLM benchmark quantitatively here. The top part
of each table shows the aforementioned FP and FN rates
of correctly or incorrectly handled CFG edges. The bottom
parts additionally present the total amounts of edges and
instructions in the binaries to ease the interpretation of the
false rates, where we also mention how many edges are
drawn in the GUI. The overall counts and corresponding
false rates are further refined into 6 partially overlapping
categories xy, with x being either I (Inter) or i (intra), and
y being A (archive), O (object file), or F (function). The
category IA, for example, is that of edges from a block
originating from one archive to a fragment originating from
another archive, i.e., inter-archive, while category iO is that
of edges between two blocks originating from the same
object file. Furthermore, we present separate numbers for
the edges that IDA Pro stores in its database because it has
detected them in the code, and the ones it shows in the
GUI because it considers them to be intraprocedural edges,
meaning that it has correctly or incorrectly put the source
and sink nodes of the edges in the same functions.
Table 3b shows that for the unprotected program, IDA
Pro does a pretty good job in detecting the true edges.
There are no fake edges of course, and most code is put
into functions. Exceptions are rare, and mostly related to
manually written and optimized assembly functions in the
linked-in crypto library that feature interprocedural jumps.
Table 3c shows that IDA Pro out-of-the-box performs
poorly on a protected program. In the GUI, it draws about
74% of the fake edges (75–76% for other benchmarks), of
which more than half connect blocks from different archives.
Furthermore, the GUI does not draw 56% of the true edges
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Fig. 15: Heatmap dissecting the applicability of factoring on the SLM benchmark, showing the number of fragments
(color) of size (minor, top X-axis) in sets covering (major, bottom X-axis) archives versus the number of covered archives
(Y-axis) in that set.
(53–56% for other benchmarks). As a result of the obfusca-
tion, IDA Pro also gave up on about 28% of the identified
instructions (23–31% for the other benchmarks), and simply
did not put that code in any function. Obviously this also
contributes to the FN rates.
Notice how these total numbers are comparable for
different benchmarks, despite their different constitution.
This is of course due to the fact that the totals do not
depend on the number of archives or object files making up
the programs. For the intra- and interarchive FPs, the rates
vary more from one benchmark to another, but they are still
comparable. For example, the GUI IA FPR with IDA Pro
out-of-the-box ranges from 39% to 55%. This relatively small
variation implies that the obtained potency ports rather well
from one benchmark to another, which is of course beneficial
for users of tools that implement the obfuscations, as it
will limit the need to retune the tool configuration for each
benchmark.
At first sight, it might seem strange that there are also
intra-function GUI FPs, since we never purposely inject fake
intra-function edges. Those FPs are a side-effect, however, as
they correspond to the never executed fall-through paths of
injected switch dispatchers, which are intra-function in our
prototype.
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Table 3d shows that an attacker-improved IDA Pro puts
almost all code into functions. The FP rates go up as a result,
and the FN rates drop significantly. Different versions of
the repartitioning algorithm never got significantly better
results than the ones reported here. Without more advanced
data flow analysis or other attacks to identify fake edges,
those edges simply confused the disassembler’s code parti-
tioning strategies. The proposed protections thus display a
significant amount of practically relevant potency.
The above results and in particular the FNs are to some
extent inherent to IDA Pro, which can put each basic block
in only one function. For the example of Figure 7, at least
one of the incoming edges of block 3a and one of the
outgoing edges of block 3b inherently become FNs. So addi-
tionally, we measure how many (source, sink) pairs of code
fragments that were split apart by factorization (e.g., pairs
(1a,1b) and (2a,2b) in Figure 6) are correctly put in the same
function by IDA Pro. The results are presented in the bottom
left parts of the tables. Most importantly, the results in Ta-
ble 3d indicate that even with the repartitioning heuristics,
the vast majority (85%, 85–88% for the other benchmarks)
of related block pairs are not put in the same function.
There are two reasons: First, when the factoring is applied
as frequently as we applied it, many non-factored fragments
end up in between two factored fragments, and thus are
no longer connected directly to any non-factored fragment.
Secondly, even if we drop the frequency of factoring to a low
number (such as 1% of all factorizable cases), the number
only drops to about 82%. It remains that high because of
the negative impact of the opaque predicate insertion on
IDA Pro’s performance. When no opaque predicates are
inserted at all, and very little factoring is performed, the
number still does not drop below 49% (51–59% for the
other benchmarks). The reason is that at about half of the
points where factorization can be applied, the points before
and after the factorized fragments are only connected via
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one direct control flow path, which then gets interrupted
because of the factoring. A detailed analysis on this can be
found at the end of Section 6.7.
We can conclude that unless IDA Pro gets the capability
of putting blocks in more than one function, which by the
design of its APIs seems like a rather fundamental and
hence hard to change underlying principle of its imple-
mentation, the proposed factoring obfuscation has a strong
potency.
6.5 Resilience
To evaluate the resilience of the presented obfuscation, we
analyze to what extent some attack techniques observed in
empirical research [1] and described in literature [20] can
bypass or undo the protections. Obviously, we cannot claim
that the protections provide complete protection against
attackers with unlimited resources and time. But we can
demonstrate that at least some common attack strategies do
not overcome the protection trivially.
First, we consider an attacker that can resolve opaque
predicate computations when he observes their complete
pattern in the code, either because he is good at recognizing
them manually, or because he has a pattern matcher. We
consider the attacker strong enough to identify opaque
predicate computations even if they are mixed with other
instructions, including (direct) control flow transfers. He
is hence knowledgable, but he is also prudent: If he only
observes part of an opaque predicate computation or ob-
serves that only part of the computation is guaranteed to
be executed leading up to the conditional branch, he does
not guess that it will be an opaque predicate with a certain
outcome. In the empirical experiments reported by Ceccato
et al. [1], attackers described how they manually eliminated
the identified fake edges and how they could implement
simple pattern matchers to automate that attack task.
To assess how far such an attacker might get in the worst
case, we implemented a script that iteratively removes all
fake edges of opaque predicates that such an attacker can
resolve. The script does not need to detect the patterns of
the opaque predicate computations itself, instead it gets the
necessary information from the ground-truth logs produced
by our obfuscator.
We developed two versions of the script. A first one
mimicks an automated attack that considers the information
in IDA Pro’s database. So it observes all edges and all
code identified by IDA Pro. We refer to this attack as the
“soundish” attack, because it considers all available code
and control flow. As IDA Pro might have missed some code
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Compiler -DLTC_NO_ASM -DLTC_SOURCE -DLTM_DESC -DPATH_MAX=2048 -DUSE_LTM -D__32BIT__
-Os -fPIC -fno-aggressive-loop-optimizations -fno-stack-protector -fno-strict-aliasing
-fomit-frame-pointer -g -marm -mcpu=cortex-a8 -msoft-float -std=c99
Linker -Wl,--fix-cortex-a8 -Wl,--hash-style=sysv -Wl,--no-demangle -Wl,--no-merge-exidx-entries
-Wl,--no-undefined -lc -shared
(a) Compile and link flags for SLM
FP/FN CFG edges drawn in GUI FP/FN CFG edges stored in database
Total IA IO IF iA iO iF Total IA IO IF iA iO iF
# FP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FPR 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
# FN 1.8k 24 618 753 1.8k 1.2k 1.1k 916 0 45 48 916 871 868
FNR 3% 0% 1% 1% 3% 2% 2% 1% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 1%
Pairs of fragments split by factorization
Total Wrong Correct
0 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
CFG edges
Total True Fake Drawn in GUI
67.2k 67.2k (100%) 0 (0%) 65.3k (97%)
Instructions
Total Functionless
281.8k 4.0k (1%)
(b) Potency metrics for SLM without the protections proposed in this technical report.
FP/FN CFG edges drawn in GUI FP/FN CFG edges stored in database
Total IA IO IF iA iO iF Total IA IO IF iA iO iF
# FP 16.5k 9.6k 12.5k 12.6k 6.9k 4.0k 3.9k 20.0k 11.8k 16.0k 16.0k 8.2k 4.0k 3.9k
FPR 74% 43% 57% 57% 31% 18% 18% 90% 53% 72% 72% 37% 18% 18%
# FN 101.4k 24 622 760 101.3k 100.7k 100.6k 63.2k 9 131 165 63.2k 63.1k 63.0k
FNR 56% 0% 0% 0% 56% 55% 55% 35% 0% 0% 0% 35% 35% 35%
Pairs of fragments split by factorization
Total Wrong Correct
28.4k 26.6k (94%) 1.7k (6%)
CFG edges
Total True Fake Drawn in GUI
204.4k 182.2k (89%) 22.2k (11%) 97.4k (48%)
Instructions
Total Functionless
772.3k 213.6k (28%)
(c) Potency metrics for a fully protected SLM with IDA Pro out-of-the-box.
FP/FN CFG edges drawn in GUI FP/FN CFG edges stored in database
Total IA IO IF iA iO iF Total IA IO IF iA iO iF
# FP 17.1k 10.0k 13.0k 13.0k 7.1k 4.1k 4.0k 21.2k 12.6k 17.0k 17.1k 8.6k 4.2k 4.1k
FPR 77% 45% 59% 59% 32% 18% 18% 96% 57% 77% 77% 39% 19% 18%
# FN 74.5k 16 492 588 74.5k 74.0k 73.9k 27.5k 0 17 20 27.5k 27.5k 27.5k
FNR 41% 0% 0% 0% 41% 41% 41% 15% 0% 0% 0% 15% 15% 15%
Pairs of fragments split by factorization
Total Wrong Correct
28.4k 24.1k (85%) 4.3k (15%)
CFG edges
Total True Fake Drawn in GUI
204.5k 182.3k (89%) 22.2k (11%) 124.9k (61%)
Instructions
Total Functionless
772.4k 122 (0%)
(d) Potency metrics for a fully protected SLM with attacker-improved IDA Pro.
FP/FN CFG edges drawn in GUI FP/FN CFG edges stored in database
Total IA IO IF iA iO iF Total IA IO IF iA iO iF
# FP 16.4k 9.5k 12.3k 12.3k 6.9k 4.1k 4.0k 21.1k 12.6k 17.0k 17.0k 8.5k 4.2k 4.1k
FPR 74% 43% 55% 56% 31% 18% 18% 95% 57% 77% 77% 39% 19% 18%
# FN 73.4k 13 459 544 73.4k 73.0k 72.9k 27.5k 0 17 20 27.5k 27.5k 27.5k
FNR 40% 0% 0% 0% 40% 40% 40% 15% 0% 0% 0% 15% 15% 15%
Pairs of fragments split by factorization
Total Wrong Correct
28.4k 24.0k (85%) 4.3k (15%)
CFG edges
Total True Fake Drawn in GUI
204.5k 182.3k (89%) 22.2k (11%) 125.2k (61%)
Instructions
Total Functionless
772.4k 122 (0%)
Opaque predicates
Total Resolved
13.3k 29 (0%)
(e) Metrics for a fully protected SLM, after detection and removal of observable opaque predicates (soundish DB attack).
FP/FN CFG edges drawn in GUI FP/FN CFG edges stored in database
Total IA IO IF iA iO iF Total IA IO IF iA iO iF
# FP 14.9k 8.3k 10.9k 11.0k 6.6k 4.0k 4.0k 18.2k 10.3k 14.1k 14.2k 7.9k 4.1k 4.0k
FPR 67% 38% 49% 49% 30% 18% 18% 82% 46% 64% 64% 36% 18% 18%
# FN 73.0k 13 448 526 73.0k 72.6k 72.5k 27.5k 0 17 20 27.5k 27.5k 27.5k
FNR 40% 0% 0% 0% 40% 40% 40% 15% 0% 0% 0% 15% 15% 15%
Pairs of fragments split by factorization
Total Wrong Correct
28.4k 24.0k (85%) 4.4k (15%)
CFG edges
Total True Fake Drawn in GUI
204.5k 182.3k (89%) 22.2k (11%) 124.2k (61%)
Instructions
Total Functionless
772.4k 122 (0%)
Opaque predicates
Total Resolved
13.3k 3.0k (22%)
(f) Metrics for a fully protected SLM, after detection and removal of observable opaque predicates (unsound GUI attack).
TABLE 3: Measurement data for SLM
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Compiler -DCCODE -DNDEBUG -DSPEC_CPU
-O2 -fno-aggressive-loop-optimizations -g -marm -mcpu=cortex-a8 -std=c99
Linker -Wl,--no-demangle -Wl,--hash-style=sysv -Wl,--no-merge-exidx-entries -Bdynamic
(a) Compile and link flags for 436.cactusADM
FP/FN CFG edges drawn in GUI FP/FN CFG edges stored in database
Total IA IO IF iA iO iF Total IA IO IF iA iO iF
# FP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FPR 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
# FN 953 11 26 43 942 927 910 504 2 2 2 502 502 502
FNR 6% 0% 0% 0% 6% 6% 5% 3% 0% 0% 0% 3% 3% 3%
Pairs of fragments split by factorization
Total Wrong Correct
0 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
CFG edges
Total True Fake Drawn in GUI
16.7k 16.7k (100%) 0 (0%) 15.8k (94%)
Instructions
Total Functionless
98.2k 2.5k (2%)
(b) Potency metrics for 436.cactusADM without the protections proposed in this technical report.
FP/FN CFG edges drawn in GUI FP/FN CFG edges stored in database
Total IA IO IF iA iO iF Total IA IO IF iA iO iF
# FP 7.6k 5.5k 5.8k 5.8k 2.1k 1.9k 1.8k 9.2k 6.9k 7.3k 7.3k 2.3k 1.9k 1.9k
FPR 76% 55% 58% 58% 21% 19% 18% 92% 69% 73% 73% 23% 19% 19%
# FN 36.1k 9 22 39 36.0k 36.0k 36.0k 20.1k 0 4 4 20.1k 20.1k 20.1k
FNR 53% 0% 0% 0% 53% 53% 53% 30% 0% 0% 0% 30% 30% 30%
Pairs of fragments split by factorization
Total Wrong Correct
8.2k 7.5k (91%) 699 (9%)
CFG edges
Total True Fake Drawn in GUI
77.6k 67.6k (87%) 10.0k (13%) 39.2k (50%)
Instructions
Total Functionless
281.3k 63.3k (23%)
(c) Potency metrics for a fully protected 436.cactusADM with IDA Pro out-of-the-box.
FP/FN CFG edges drawn in GUI FP/FN CFG edges stored in database
Total IA IO IF iA iO iF Total IA IO IF iA iO iF
# FP 7.8k 5.6k 5.9k 5.9k 2.1k 1.9k 1.9k 9.5k 7.2k 7.6k 7.6k 2.3k 2.0k 1.9k
FPR 77% 56% 59% 59% 21% 19% 19% 95% 72% 75% 76% 23% 20% 19%
# FN 29.3k 7 14 30 29.3k 29.3k 29.2k 11.5k 0 0 0 11.5k 11.5k 11.5k
FNR 43% 0% 0% 0% 43% 43% 43% 17% 0% 0% 0% 17% 17% 17%
Pairs of fragments split by factorization
Total Wrong Correct
8.2k 7.0k (85%) 1.2k (15%)
CFG edges
Total True Fake Drawn in GUI
77.6k 67.5k (87%) 10.0k (13%) 46.0k (59%)
Instructions
Total Functionless
281.4k 1.8k (1%)
(d) Potency metrics for a fully protected 436.cactusADM with attacker-improved IDA Pro.
FP/FN CFG edges drawn in GUI FP/FN CFG edges stored in database
Total IA IO IF iA iO iF Total IA IO IF iA iO iF
# FP 7.5k 5.3k 5.6k 5.6k 2.1k 1.9k 1.8k 9.5k 7.1k 7.5k 7.5k 2.3k 2.0k 1.9k
FPR 74% 53% 56% 56% 21% 19% 18% 94% 71% 75% 75% 23% 19% 19%
# FN 28.4k 6 13 29 28.4k 28.4k 28.4k 11.5k 0 0 0 11.5k 11.5k 11.5k
FNR 42% 0% 0% 0% 42% 42% 42% 17% 0% 0% 0% 17% 17% 17%
Pairs of fragments split by factorization
Total Wrong Correct
8.2k 6.9k (84%) 1.3k (16%)
CFG edges
Total True Fake Drawn in GUI
77.6k 67.5k (87%) 10.0k (13%) 46.6k (60%)
Instructions
Total Functionless
281.4k 1.8k (1%)
Opaque predicates
Total Resolved
6.2k 48 (1%)
(e) Metrics for a fully protected 436.cactusADM, after detection and removal of observable opaque predicates (soundish DB attack).
FP/FN CFG edges drawn in GUI FP/FN CFG edges stored in database
Total IA IO IF iA iO iF Total IA IO IF iA iO iF
# FP 6.8k 4.7k 5.0k 5.0k 2.0k 1.8k 1.8k 8.2k 5.9k 6.3k 6.3k 2.2k 1.9k 1.9k
FPR 68% 47% 49% 50% 20% 18% 18% 82% 59% 63% 63% 22% 19% 19%
# FN 28.5k 4 10 26 28.5k 28.5k 28.5k 11.5k 0 0 0 11.5k 11.5k 11.5k
FNR 42% 0% 0% 0% 42% 42% 42% 17% 0% 0% 0% 17% 17% 17%
Pairs of fragments split by factorization
Total Wrong Correct
8.2k 6.9k (84%) 1.3k (16%)
CFG edges
Total True Fake Drawn in GUI
77.6k 67.5k (87%) 10.0k (13%) 45.8k (59%)
Instructions
Total Functionless
281.4k 1.8k (1%)
Opaque predicates
Total Resolved
6.2k 1.3k (21%)
(f) Metrics for a fully protected 436.cactusADM, after detection and removal of observable opaque predicates (unsound GUI attack).
TABLE 4: Measurement data for 436.cactusADM
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Compiler -DHAVE_CONFIG_H -DNDEBUG -DSPEC_CPU
-O2 -fno-aggressive-loop-optimizations -g -marm -mcpu=cortex-a8 -std=c99
Linker -Wl,--no-demangle -Wl,--hash-style=sysv -Wl,--no-merge-exidx-entries -Bdynamic -lm
(a) Compile and link flags for 445.gobmk
FP/FN CFG edges drawn in GUI FP/FN CFG edges stored in database
Total IA IO IF iA iO iF Total IA IO IF iA iO iF
# FP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FPR 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
# FN 6.0k 93 176 283 5.9k 5.8k 5.7k 5.2k 81 113 122 5.1k 5.1k 5.1k
FNR 20% 0% 1% 1% 20% 19% 19% 17% 0% 0% 0% 17% 17% 17%
Pairs of fragments split by factorization
Total Wrong Correct
0 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
CFG edges
Total True Fake Drawn in GUI
30.4k 30.4k (100%) 0 (0%) 24.4k (80%)
Instructions
Total Functionless
151.6k 51.0k (34%)
(b) Potency metrics for 445.gobmk without the protections proposed in this technical report.
FP/FN CFG edges drawn in GUI FP/FN CFG edges stored in database
Total IA IO IF iA iO iF Total IA IO IF iA iO iF
# FP 10.9k 5.7k 8.1k 8.4k 5.2k 2.8k 2.5k 12.9k 6.8k 10.0k 10.4k 6.1k 2.9k 2.5k
FPR 75% 39% 56% 58% 36% 19% 17% 89% 47% 68% 71% 42% 20% 17%
# FN 58.0k 93 178 287 57.9k 57.8k 57.7k 36.2k 59 99 128 36.1k 36.1k 36.1k
FNR 56% 0% 0% 0% 56% 56% 56% 35% 0% 0% 0% 35% 35% 35%
Pairs of fragments split by factorization
Total Wrong Correct
15.7k 14.7k (94%) 919 (6%)
CFG edges
Total True Fake Drawn in GUI
118.0k 103.5k (88%) 14.6k (12%) 56.4k (48%)
Instructions
Total Functionless
413.9k 127.6k (31%)
(c) Potency metrics for a fully protected 445.gobmk with IDA Pro out-of-the-box.
FP/FN CFG edges drawn in GUI FP/FN CFG edges stored in database
Total IA IO IF iA iO iF Total IA IO IF iA iO iF
# FP 11.5k 6.2k 8.7k 8.9k 5.4k 2.9k 2.6k 13.8k 7.5k 10.8k 11.2k 6.4k 3.0k 2.6k
FPR 79% 42% 59% 61% 37% 20% 18% 95% 51% 74% 77% 44% 21% 18%
# FN 42.7k 38 90 170 42.7k 42.6k 42.5k 16.1k 0 3 5 16.1k 16.1k 16.1k
FNR 41% 0% 0% 0% 41% 41% 41% 16% 0% 0% 0% 16% 16% 16%
Pairs of fragments split by factorization
Total Wrong Correct
15.7k 13.4k (86%) 2.2k (14%)
CFG edges
Total True Fake Drawn in GUI
118.1k 103.6k (88%) 14.6k (12%) 72.4k (61%)
Instructions
Total Functionless
414.0k 86 (0%)
(d) Potency metrics for a fully protected 445.gobmk with attacker-improved IDA Pro.
FP/FN CFG edges drawn in GUI FP/FN CFG edges stored in database
Total IA IO IF iA iO iF Total IA IO IF iA iO iF
# FP 11.1k 5.9k 8.3k 8.5k 5.2k 2.8k 2.6k 13.8k 7.4k 10.7k 11.2k 6.4k 3.0k 2.6k
FPR 76% 40% 57% 59% 36% 20% 18% 95% 51% 74% 77% 44% 21% 18%
# FN 42.0k 34 80 152 41.9k 41.9k 41.8k 16.1k 0 3 5 16.1k 16.1k 16.1k
FNR 41% 0% 0% 0% 40% 40% 40% 16% 0% 0% 0% 16% 16% 16%
Pairs of fragments split by factorization
Total Wrong Correct
15.7k 13.4k (85%) 2.3k (15%)
CFG edges
Total True Fake Drawn in GUI
118.1k 103.6k (88%) 14.6k (12%) 72.7k (62%)
Instructions
Total Functionless
414.0k 86 (0%)
Opaque predicates
Total Resolved
9.0k 65 (1%)
(e) Metrics for a fully protected 445.gobmk, after detection and removal of observable opaque predicates (soundish DB attack).
FP/FN CFG edges drawn in GUI FP/FN CFG edges stored in database
Total IA IO IF iA iO iF Total IA IO IF iA iO iF
# FP 10.1k 5.2k 7.3k 7.6k 5.0k 2.8k 2.5k 12.0k 6.2k 9.1k 9.4k 5.8k 3.0k 2.6k
FPR 70% 35% 50% 52% 34% 19% 17% 83% 42% 62% 65% 40% 20% 18%
# FN 41.7k 31 74 139 41.7k 41.6k 41.6k 16.1k 0 3 5 16.1k 16.1k 16.1k
FNR 40% 0% 0% 0% 40% 40% 40% 16% 0% 0% 0% 16% 16% 16%
Pairs of fragments split by factorization
Total Wrong Correct
15.7k 13.3k (85%) 2.3k (15%)
CFG edges
Total True Fake Drawn in GUI
118.1k 103.6k (88%) 14.6k (12%) 72.0k (61%)
Instructions
Total Functionless
414.0k 86 (0%)
Opaque predicates
Total Resolved
9.0k 1.8k (20%)
(f) Metrics for a fully protected 445.gobmk, after detection and removal of observable opaque predicates (unsound GUI attack).
TABLE 5: Measurement data for 445.gobmk
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Compiler -DNDEBUG -DSPEC_CPU
-O2 -fno-aggressive-loop-optimizations -g -marm -mcpu=cortex-a8 -std=c99
Linker -Wl,--no-demangle -Wl,--hash-style=sysv -Wl,--no-merge-exidx-entries -Bdynamic -lm
(a) Compile and link flags for 454.calculix
FP/FN CFG edges drawn in GUI FP/FN CFG edges stored in database
Total IA IO IF iA iO iF Total IA IO IF iA iO iF
# FP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FPR 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
# FN 2.9k 0 100 174 2.9k 2.8k 2.8k 2.6k 0 13 35 2.6k 2.6k 2.6k
FNR 6% 0% 0% 0% 6% 6% 6% 6% 0% 0% 0% 6% 6% 6%
Pairs of fragments split by factorization
Total Wrong Correct
0 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
CFG edges
Total True Fake Drawn in GUI
45.5k 45.5k (100%) 0 (0%) 42.5k (94%)
Instructions
Total Functionless
364.0k 12.1k (3%)
(b) Potency metrics for 454.calculix without the protections proposed in this technical report.
FP/FN CFG edges drawn in GUI FP/FN CFG edges stored in database
Total IA IO IF iA iO iF Total IA IO IF iA iO iF
# FP 37.4k 22.2k 27.5k 27.7k 15.2k 9.9k 9.8k 45.1k 26.8k 34.9k 35.1k 18.3k 10.2k 10.0k
FPR 75% 44% 55% 55% 30% 20% 19% 90% 54% 70% 70% 36% 20% 20%
# FN 150.3k 1 231 675 150.3k 150.1k 149.6k 88.5k 1 107 381 88.5k 88.4k 88.1k
FNR 54% 0% 0% 0% 54% 54% 54% 32% 0% 0% 0% 32% 32% 32%
Pairs of fragments split by factorization
Total Wrong Correct
31.2k 29.1k (93%) 2.1k (7%)
CFG edges
Total True Fake Drawn in GUI
329.1k 279.0k (85%) 50.1k (15%) 166.1k (50%)
Instructions
Total Functionless
1224.4k 311.7k (25%)
(c) Potency metrics for a fully protected 454.calculix with IDA Pro out-of-the-box.
FP/FN CFG edges drawn in GUI FP/FN CFG edges stored in database
Total IA IO IF iA iO iF Total IA IO IF iA iO iF
# FP 38.9k 23.4k 28.8k 29.0k 15.5k 10.1k 10.0k 47.6k 28.6k 37.0k 37.3k 19.0k 10.5k 10.3k
FPR 78% 47% 58% 58% 31% 20% 20% 95% 57% 74% 74% 38% 21% 21%
# FN 117.6k 0 116 287 117.6k 117.5k 117.3k 46.9k 0 3 10 46.9k 46.9k 46.9k
FNR 42% 0% 0% 0% 42% 42% 42% 17% 0% 0% 0% 17% 17% 17%
Pairs of fragments split by factorization
Total Wrong Correct
31.2k 27.1k (87%) 4.1k (13%)
CFG edges
Total True Fake Drawn in GUI
329.1k 279.0k (85%) 50.1k (15%) 200.3k (61%)
Instructions
Total Functionless
1224.5k 241 (0%)
(d) Potency metrics for a fully protected 454.calculix with attacker-improved IDA Pro.
FP/FN CFG edges drawn in GUI FP/FN CFG edges stored in database
Total IA IO IF iA iO iF Total IA IO IF iA iO iF
# FP 37.2k 22.1k 27.2k 27.3k 15.1k 10.1k 9.9k 47.5k 28.5k 36.9k 37.2k 18.9k 10.5k 10.3k
FPR 74% 44% 54% 54% 30% 20% 20% 95% 57% 74% 74% 38% 21% 21%
# FN 115.0k 0 76 167 115.0k 114.9k 114.8k 46.9k 0 3 10 46.9k 46.9k 46.9k
FNR 41% 0% 0% 0% 41% 41% 41% 17% 0% 0% 0% 17% 17% 17%
Pairs of fragments split by factorization
Total Wrong Correct
31.2k 27.0k (86%) 4.2k (14%)
CFG edges
Total True Fake Drawn in GUI
329.1k 279.0k (85%) 50.1k (15%) 201.2k (61%)
Instructions
Total Functionless
1224.5k 241 (0%)
Opaque predicates
Total Resolved
29.0k 126 (0%)
(e) Metrics for a fully protected 454.calculix, after detection and removal of observable opaque predicates (soundish DB attack).
FP/FN CFG edges drawn in GUI FP/FN CFG edges stored in database
Total IA IO IF iA iO iF Total IA IO IF iA iO iF
# FP 33.9k 19.2k 24.0k 24.2k 14.7k 9.9k 9.7k 41.2k 23.0k 30.9k 31.1k 18.2k 10.4k 10.1k
FPR 68% 38% 48% 48% 29% 20% 19% 82% 46% 62% 62% 36% 21% 20%
# FN 114.4k 0 64 141 114.4k 114.3k 114.2k 46.9k 0 3 10 46.9k 46.9k 46.9k
FNR 41% 0% 0% 0% 41% 41% 41% 17% 0% 0% 0% 17% 17% 17%
Pairs of fragments split by factorization
Total Wrong Correct
31.2k 26.9k (86%) 4.3k (14%)
CFG edges
Total True Fake Drawn in GUI
329.1k 279.0k (85%) 50.1k (15%) 198.5k (60%)
Instructions
Total Functionless
1224.5k 241 (0%)
Opaque predicates
Total Resolved
29.0k 6.4k (22%)
(f) Metrics for a fully protected 454.calculix, after detection and removal of observable opaque predicates (unsound GUI attack).
TABLE 6: Measurement data for 454.calculix
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Compiler (C) -Os -Wa,--noexecstack -fPIE -fdata-sections -ffunction-sections -fgcse-after-reload
-fno-builtin-sin -fno-exceptions -fno-short-enums -fno-strict-aliasing
-fno-strict-volatile-bitfields -fomit-frame-pointer -fpic -frename-registers
-frerun-cse-after-loop -fstack-protector -funwind-tables -march=armv7-a -marm
-mfloat-abi=softfp -mfpu=neon -msoft-float -mthumb-interwork -std=c99
Compiler (C++) -fno-rtti -fvisibility-inlines-hidden
Linker -Wl,--fix-cortex-a8 -Wl,--hash-style=sysv -Wl,--no-demangle -Wl,--no-merge-exidx-entries
-Wl,--no-undefined -Wl,-fuse-ld=bfd -Wl,-shared,-Bsymbolic -Wl,-z,noexecstack -Wl,-z,now
-Wl,-z,relro -lbinder -lc -lcutils -ldl -ldrmframework -ldrmframeworkcommon -lgcc -licuuc
-llog -lm -lsqlite -lstdc++ -lstlport -lutils -shared
(a) Compile and link flags for DRM
FP/FN CFG edges drawn in GUI FP/FN CFG edges stored in database
Total IA IO IF iA iO iF Total IA IO IF iA iO iF
# FP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FPR 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
# FN 2.0k 22 603 710 1.9k 1.4k 1.3k 1.0k 1 30 34 1.0k 1.0k 1.0k
FNR 3% 0% 1% 1% 3% 2% 2% 2% 0% 0% 0% 2% 2% 2%
Pairs of fragments split by factorization
Total Wrong Correct
0 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
CFG edges
Total True Fake Drawn in GUI
61.4k 61.4k (100%) 0 (0%) 59.5k (97%)
Instructions
Total Functionless
260.8k 4.6k (2%)
(b) Potency metrics for DRM without the protections proposed in this technical report.
FP/FN CFG edges drawn in GUI FP/FN CFG edges stored in database
Total IA IO IF iA iO iF Total IA IO IF iA iO iF
# FP 17.0k 9.0k 13.1k 13.2k 8.0k 3.9k 3.8k 20.5k 10.9k 16.6k 16.7k 9.6k 3.9k 3.8k
FPR 76% 40% 58% 59% 36% 17% 17% 91% 49% 74% 74% 43% 17% 17%
# FN 92.4k 23 591 700 92.4k 91.8k 91.7k 56.1k 5 113 135 56.1k 56.0k 56.0k
FNR 54% 0% 0% 0% 54% 54% 54% 33% 0% 0% 0% 33% 33% 33%
Pairs of fragments split by factorization
Total Wrong Correct
26.0k 24.3k (93%) 1.7k (7%)
CFG edges
Total True Fake Drawn in GUI
193.8k 171.4k (88%) 22.5k (12%) 95.9k (49%)
Instructions
Total Functionless
731.6k 189.7k (26%)
(c) Potency metrics for a fully protected DRM with IDA Pro out-of-the-box.
FP/FN CFG edges drawn in GUI FP/FN CFG edges stored in database
Total IA IO IF iA iO iF Total IA IO IF iA iO iF
# FP 17.4k 9.3k 13.5k 13.6k 8.2k 3.9k 3.8k 21.5k 11.6k 17.5k 17.7k 9.9k 4.0k 3.9k
FPR 78% 41% 60% 60% 36% 17% 17% 96% 52% 78% 78% 44% 18% 17%
# FN 69.7k 16 469 555 69.7k 69.3k 69.2k 25.1k 0 5 6 25.1k 25.1k 25.1k
FNR 41% 0% 0% 0% 41% 40% 40% 15% 0% 0% 0% 15% 15% 15%
Pairs of fragments split by factorization
Total Wrong Correct
26.0k 22.2k (85%) 3.8k (15%)
CFG edges
Total True Fake Drawn in GUI
194.3k 171.8k (88%) 22.5k (12%) 119.5k (62%)
Instructions
Total Functionless
731.7k 388 (0%)
(d) Potency metrics for a fully protected DRM with attacker-improved IDA Pro.
FP/FN CFG edges drawn in GUI FP/FN CFG edges stored in database
Total IA IO IF iA iO iF Total IA IO IF iA iO iF
# FP 16.6k 8.7k 12.7k 12.8k 7.9k 3.9k 3.8k 21.5k 11.6k 17.5k 17.6k 9.9k 4.0k 3.9k
FPR 74% 39% 57% 57% 35% 17% 17% 95% 51% 78% 78% 44% 18% 17%
# FN 69.1k 15 450 525 69.0k 68.6k 68.5k 25.1k 0 5 6 25.1k 25.1k 25.1k
FNR 40% 0% 0% 0% 40% 40% 40% 15% 0% 0% 0% 15% 15% 15%
Pairs of fragments split by factorization
Total Wrong Correct
26.0k 22.2k (85%) 3.8k (15%)
CFG edges
Total True Fake Drawn in GUI
194.3k 171.8k (88%) 22.5k (12%) 119.4k (61%)
Instructions
Total Functionless
731.7k 388 (0%)
Opaque predicates
Total Resolved
14.2k 62 (0%)
(e) Metrics for a fully protected DRM, after detection and removal of observable opaque predicates (soundish DB attack).
FP/FN CFG edges drawn in GUI FP/FN CFG edges stored in database
Total IA IO IF iA iO iF Total IA IO IF iA iO iF
# FP 15.1k 7.7k 11.3k 11.4k 7.4k 3.8k 3.7k 18.4k 9.4k 14.5k 14.6k 9.0k 3.9k 3.8k
FPR 67% 34% 50% 51% 33% 17% 17% 82% 42% 64% 65% 40% 17% 17%
# FN 68.5k 14 430 500 68.4k 68.0k 68.0k 25.1k 0 5 6 25.1k 25.1k 25.1k
FNR 40% 0% 0% 0% 40% 40% 40% 15% 0% 0% 0% 15% 15% 15%
Pairs of fragments split by factorization
Total Wrong Correct
26.0k 22.1k (85%) 3.9k (15%)
CFG edges
Total True Fake Drawn in GUI
194.3k 171.8k (88%) 22.5k (12%) 118.5k (61%)
Instructions
Total Functionless
731.7k 388 (0%)
Opaque predicates
Total Resolved
14.2k 3.1k (22%)
(f) Metrics for a fully protected DRM, after detection and removal of observable opaque predicates (unsound GUI attack).
TABLE 7: Measurement data for DRM
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Fig. 20: Instructions reachable from function entry points in different numbers of archives/object files/functions, before
(left bars) and after (right bars) factoring (SLM).
and edges, it is not completely sound, but it is the closest
to sound an automated tool based on IDA Pro disassembler
results can get.
The second version of the script mimicks a manual,
human attack that considers only the information displayed
in the IDA Pro GUI. This attack is on the one hand weaker
because it does not resolve opaque predicates of which IDA
Pro put parts of the computations in two or more different
functions, as those parts are then not shown to the attacker
together. On the other hand, this attack is stronger in cases
in which IDA Pro has put all the predicate computations
in the same function, but in which it does not draw a fake
edge that arrives into the middle of the computations, i.e.,
in which such a fake edge is a GUI TN. So this attacker will
miss some opportunities, but he will also remove fake edges
because other (fake) edges remain invisible to him. We refer
to this attack as the “unsound” attack, because the attacker
chooses to neglect information readily available in the IDA
Pro database that an attacker trying to be sound would not
have neglected. As each deleted fake edge can result in
opportunities to improve the partitioning of the code into
functions, the scripts also execute the repartitioning algo-
rithm discussed in the previous paragraph to potentially
improve IDA Pro’s performance after every deletion of a
fake edge.
The results for the soundish attack are shown in Table 3e,
those for the unsound attack are shown in Table 3f. To
indicate to which extent the modeled attacker was able to
resolve the opaque predicates, we report the number of
inserted and resolved opaque predicates in the bottom right
parts of the tables.
With the soundish attack, almost no (0–1% for the
other benchmarks) opaque predicates can be resolved. This
demonstrates the effectiveness of the strategy to couple
opaque predicates.
With the unsound attack, about 22% (20–22% for the
other benchmarks) of the opaque predicates can be resolved.
In this scenario, a relatively large drop of about 10% (9–
11% for the other benchmarks) for the number of drawn
fake edges in the GUI is observed. Still, about 67% of the
fake edges remain. This is due to the coupling of opaque
predicates in cycles, as discussed in Section 4.2 and because
of the addition of fake entries in the switch tables of the
dispatchers. Here, too, the number of true edges that do
not get drawn remains high. While the attack has therefore
weakened the confusion created by our obfuscations in the
eyes of the attacker, he has not been able to remove it
completely. Similar results for the other benchmarks are
available in Tables 4e-4f, 5e-5f, 6e-6f and 7e-7f.
Regarding the resilience against the automated, generic
deobfuscation technique of Yadegari et al. [20], we already
noted in Section 6.3 that the majority of covered dispatchers
does not display quasi-invariant behavior. Figure 21 shows
the fractions of the dispatchers that are not covered (i.e.,
not executed for our training inputs), feature quasi-invariant
behavior (i.e., “return” to only one “return site”), and show
variable behavior (i.e., “return” to multiple “return sites”).
Note the correlation with the overall coverage numbers
in Figure 9. Obviously, if only a small percentage of the
code is covered, and factoring is done on both covered and
uncovered slices, only a small percentage of the dispatchers
will be covered, let alone display variable behavior. Of those
covered, between 39% (DRM) and 83% (445.gobmk) have
variable behavior, and will hence not be simplified by the
quasi-invariance based generic deobfuscation.
6.6 Overhead
Obfuscating transformations always come with perfor-
mance and code size overhead. The performance penalty
can be limited by using profile information to stay clear from
the hottest code. As we only proposed a new way to redirect
fake edges of opaque predicates, rather than introduce new
ones which require new code sequences to be injected, we
do not evaluate the performance penalty of opaque predi-
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Fig. 21: Variability of dispatcher execution paths
cate insertion. Instead we focus on the proposed factoring
technique, which can involve the insertion of considerable
glue code, and which is hence expected to have a major
impact on performance and code size. To measure those
impacts, we steered the selection process of our obfuscator
tool to exclude a certain fraction of the hottest code, which
we express in permille. A value of 0 includes even the
hottest code, a value of 1000 excludes all the executed code.
Figure 22 shows the run time overhead which, as expected,
decreases when more executed code is excluded from the
selection process. Figure 23 shows the overhead in code size
which, as expected, drops when more code is excluded.
A summary of the data in both figures can be found in
Figure 24. The measured run times are averages of 5 runs.
For the SPEC benchmarks, we used slightly altered reference
inputs to reduce run times on the (relatively slow) developer
boards; for the SLM benchmark we used a custom input; for
the DRM benchmark we have no run time measurement as
this is an interactive application. Each pair of dashed/solid
lines on the chart corresponds to one benchmark. The dif-
ferent points denote different amounts of factoring, guided
by profile information. To collect profile information, (stan-
dard) training inputs were used that in each case differ from
the measurement inputs. The measured versions range from
no covered code being factored (lower left points) to all code
being factored (upper right points). In between, gradually
more, hotter code (i.e., more frequently executed code) gets
factored. It is clear that the overheads can become very
large if the transformation is deployed blindly, but also that
the overheads, in particularly the performance overhead
can be easily reduced by excluding the hottest fragments
from the factorization. To what extent a certain reduction
limits the practical effectiveness of the protection of course
depends on the software at hand. In any case, excluding all
covered code cannot result in factored code dispatchers with
variable behavior. So clearly one should be willing to accept
some performance overhead. We do not consider this a big
problem: All MATE protections inherently come with some
overhead. Note that for the code size, the smallest overheads
are still rather large because we only excluded the executed
code. If program size is more important than performance, a
better strategy would be to exclude non-executed fragments.
Then much smaller size overheads can still be obtained.
6.7 Sensitivity analysis
Our Diablo-based obfuscator can be configured with many
parameters to steer its algorithms and to select which pro-
tections to apply. Table 8 lists the parameters that are most
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Fig. 22: Steering the factoring candidate selection process
based on code hotness (run time overhead)
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Fig. 23: Steering the factoring candidate selection process
based on code hotness (code size overhead)
relevant for this technical report, along with the default
values we used for our measurements, i.e., unless explicitly
stated otherwise. Parameter 1 represents the seed for the
main RNG from which random numbers are generated and
other RNGs are seeded. Changing its value will steer the
pseudo-random processes into making other decisions. For
example, other code fragments will be selected for factorisa-
tion or opaque predicates will be inserted at other locations.
Parameter 2 is the random seed used to randomize the code
layout. Changing this value only affects the code layout
ordering of the protected program. Parameter 3 denotes the
probability for a basic block to have an opaque predicate
with conditional branch injected into it. The parameter
hence controls how many opaque predicates will be present
in the protected program. Parameters 4 and 5 control the
coupled opaque predicate cycle size and creation proba-
bility, respectively. Predicates are grouped according to the
cycle size, and then for each group, a probabilistic decision
is taken to put them in an actual cycle or not. Parameter
6 is the probability of fake edges being the fall-though
edges out of conditional branches, rather than the branch-
taken edges. Parameters 7 to 8 control our code factoring
technique. Parameter 7 steers the number of fake entries
added to switch-based dispatchers. Parameter 8 controls
how many of all actual factoring opportunities get factored
eventually, by controlling the probability with which each
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Fig. 24: Overhead versus factored code fragments
Parameter Value
1. main RNG seed 0xDEADDEADDEADDEAD
2. code layout random seed 1
3. predicate insertion probability 20%
4. fake edge cycle size 4
5. fake edge cycle insertion probability 100%
6. fake edge fall-through probability 50%
7. fake table entry probability 30%
8. factoring transformation probability 100%
9. enabled dispatchers all types
10. fraction of hottest code to skip 0%
11. branch flipping on
TABLE 8: Default values for the most important obfuscator
parameters
considered actual candidate set is factored or skipped. One
or more dispatcher types can be (de)activated by tuning
parameter 9. Parameter 10 allows to trade-off efficiency and
effectiveness, by controlling how much of the hottest code
is excluded from factoring. Finally, parameter 11 enables or
disables Diablo’s the branch flipping transformation, which
randomly flips the condition code of conditional branches,
together with the corresponding fall-through and branch-
taken edges.
We evaluated the effect of each parameter by plotting
the false rates (FPR and FNR) for each benchmark, where
we assume the default values in Table 8 for all but the
evaluated parameter. Unless mentioned otherwise, only one
parameter has its value swept in each evaluation. In each
plot, the primary axis (left) is the axis for the false rates.
As the false rates are relative to the absolute number of
fake and true edges, and as these numbers change with
most parameters, we also plot those on a secondary vertical
axis (right). To put things into perspective, we discuss the
false rates for a protected program that has been analysed
with an attacker-improved IDA Pro, where we consider the
false rates before and after the program has been attacked
with our scripted attack discussed in Section 6.5. Hence, the
plotted results for the SLM correspond to the data presented
in Table 3d (before the attack), Table 3e (after the soundish
attack) and Table 3f (after the unsound attack). To keep the
plots simple, we only draw the database-based false rates
for the soundish attack. Similarly, we only draw the GUI-
based false rates for the unsound attack. As the results and
trends are very similar for each benchmark, we discuss only
the numerical values for the 436.cactusADM benchmark in
the text (upper-left plot).
In general, the following conclusions can be made for
all parameters: Because the GUI does not draw all edges
(especially interprocedural ones, in the context of the parti-
tioning of IDA Pro), the FPR for the database will always be
higher than the one for the GUI, at least for the unattacked
programs. Similarly, the FNR for the database will always
be lower than that for the GUI.
To analyse the effects of parameter 1, we set its value
to 10 arbitrarily chosen values. We observed that the false
rates hardly vary: the standard deviations measured for
the different false rates and benchmarks over the 10 PRNG
seeds never exceed 0.7%. For parameter 2, similar results
were obtained (0.6%). This independence of the obtained
results from the used random seeds is important in practice,
because it makes the outcome of using the tool, and in
particular of the tuning process of the other parameters on
a specific case at hand, more predictable.
Figure 25 shows the results when we evaluate the sen-
sitivity of the probability to transform an actual factoring
opportunity. For this parameter, we assumed values of 1%,
10%, 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100%.
• Before attacking the program, the DB FPR decreases
from 100% to about 95%, while the DB FNR increases
from 0% to about 17%. When little factoring is ap-
plied, the 20% opaque insertion is their main cause.
The numbers evolve with more factoring because
IDA Pro incorrectly handles some dispatcher con-
structs. The GUI FPR slightly drops from about 85%
to about 80%. The GUI FNR increases from about
22% to about 40% for reasons similar to those for the
DB FNR. This false rate is higher, however, as IDA
Pro’s GUI does not draw interprocedural edges.
• Performing the soundish attack does not change the
false rates much.
• After the unsound attack, the GUI FPR remains more
or less constant at about 65-70%. The reason is that
the attack eliminates approximately the same num-
ber of fake opaque predicate edges, independently
of the fake switch table edges, because the latter are
most often not drawn in the GUI. The GUI FNR
does not change much compared to the unattacked
program.
Figure 26 shows the results for the sensitivity analysis
of the probability to insert fake edge cycles, for which
we assumed values of 0%, 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100%. To
prevent the created cycles from being interrupted due to
incorrectly analysed switch dispatchers, we only enabled
the conditional jump dispatchers here.
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Fig. 25: Sensitivity analysis on the factoring transformation probability (X-axis)
• Before attacking the program, the DB FPR remains
constant at 100%, the DB FNR at 0%. IDA Pro iden-
tifies almost all instructions in this case, because
we injected no switch-based dispatchers as stated
above. The GUI FPR increases linearly from about
60% to about 75% because of the interplay between
IDA PRo’s heuristics to combine code into functions,
and the fact that creating more cycles in the opaque
predicate computations lowers the fraction of fake
edges that can be implemented as fall-through paths.
By contrast, the GUI FNR remains flat at about 30%
because the total number of opaque predicates stays
the same in this experiment.
• After the soundish attack, the DB FPR increases
linearly from about 5% to 100%, which indicates
that the coupling of opaque predicates works as
expected. As this attack only focuses at resolving
opaque predicates, the DB FNR does not change.
• After performing the unsound attack, the GUI FPR
increases from about 15% to about 60%. The GUI
FNR does not change much, dropping by about 2%.
Notice that the DB FPR and the GUI FPR cross at a proba-
bility of about 25%. For low cycle creation probabilities, the
unsound attack performs worse than the soundish attack
due to the splitting of opaque predicate calculations over
functions, as explained in Section 4.2. For higher probabili-
ties, the number of not drawn fake edges dominates, so then
the soundish attack performs worse.
In Figure 27, we show how the size of fake edge cycles
affects the false rates for sizes 1, 2, 4, 6, and 10. For similar
reasons as in the previous experiment, we only enabled
conditional jump dispatchers here.
• Before attacking the program, the DB FPR remains
constant at 100%, the DB FNR at 0%. IDA Pro iden-
tifies almost all instructions in this case, because
we injected no switch-based dispatchers as stated
above. The GUI FPR decreases from 100% to about
70%, stabilizing from cycles of size 4. The GUI FNR
increases from about 20% to about 30% in a similar
way. The dependence between the cycle size and the
GUI FRs results from the interplay between IDA Pro
heuristics to partition the code into functions, and
the fact that the cycle size impacts the fraction of
fake edges that are fall-through edges. This fraction
evolves non-linearly (1, 1/2, 1/4, 1/6, 1/10).
• The soundish attack does not change the DB FPR
and DB FNR due to the strong coupling between the
opaque predicates, as discussed previously.
• After the unsound attack, the GUI FPR drops from
100% to about 50%. Fake edges coming into an
opaque predicate computation are more likely to be
drawn in smaller cycles. The GUI FNR does not
change much compared to the unattacked program.
Notice that, for cycles of size 1, no opaque predicates can be
resolved (i.e., the DB FPR and GUI FPR remain the same).
Obviously, this is because the calculation of each opaque
predicate is interrupted by its own fake edge. Hence, no
opaque predicate can be resolved by our attack. This is a
contrived configuration, as it is easy to set up a similar
attack that only requires local analysis on each predicate
computation in isolation to identify them. We included it
for the sake of completeness anyway.
In Figure 28, we show how the sparseness of the dis-
patcher’s switch tables affects the false rates for values of
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Fig. 26: Sensitivity analysis on the probability to create cycles of coupled obfuscations (X-axis)
0%, 10%, 20%, and 30%.
• Before attacking the program, the DB FPR decreases
from 100% to about 95% with increasing sparseness.
The GUI FPR follows a similar trend, but starts at
about 82%, decreasing to about 80% due to the IDA
Pro GUI not drawing all control flow. The DB FNR
and GUI FNR do not change much, which of course
is due to IDA Pro either supporting our dispatchers
or not, independent of the sparseness of the switch
tables. The DB FNR is not zero (about 17%), however,
providing evidence that IDA Pro does not analyse
the control flow from all dispatcher types.
• The soundish attack does not impact the false rates.
• After the unsound attack, the GUI FPR decreases
from about 72% to about 70%. Compared to the
numbers before the attack, about 10% of the fake
edges are eliminated. The GUI FNR does not change
much compared to the unattacked scenario.
From the results discussed above, we conclude that this
parameter does not influence the false rates much.
In Figure 29, we show the results of the sensitivity
analysis for the probability to make fake edges fall-through
when we set it to 0%, 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100%. As the
branch flipping transformation (controlled by parameter
11) randomly flips the condition of (opaque) conditional
branches, we disabled that transformation here.
• Before attacking the program, the DB FPR remains
constant at about 95%, which is due to the default
value for the sparseness parameter of 30%. Similarly,
the DB FNR remains constant at about 17%. The
GUI FPR increases from about 70% to about 80%,
confirming our observation in Section 4 that IDA
Pro prefers drawing fall-through edges over branch-
taken ones. For the same reasons as for the DB FNR,
the GUI FNR remains constant at about 40%.
• The soundish attack does not change the false rates.
This is of course explained by the coupling of the
opaque predicates, as discussed for Figure 26. (The
default value for that parameter is 100%.)
• After the unsound attack, the GUI FPR increases
from about 55% to about 65%. The number of re-
solved opaque predicates slightly decreases with in-
creasing probabilities, indicating that the parameter
has only a small effect. The GUI FNR does not change
much compared to the unattacked program.
We conclude that the small impact of this parameter does
not force a defender to pick a value within a small range.
This ensures that attackers will not be able to create custom
attacks that exploit a preferred direction of fake edges.
Figure 30 shows the effect of changing the probability to
insert opaque predicates by setting it to 0%, 2%, 5%, 20%,
50%, and 100%.
• Before attacking the program, the DB FPR increases
from about 90% to about 100%, while the DB FNR
decreases from about 20% to about 10%. When no
opaque predicates are inserted, the only fake edges
are those inserted by the dispatcher’s sparse switch
tables, which are not always analysed properly.
Hence the 90% starting value for the DB FPR. As
more opaque predicates are inserted, the fraction
of fake edges contributed by the switch tables de-
creases. The trend for the DB FNR can be explained
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Fig. 27: Sensitivity analysis on the size of coupled obfuscation cycles (X-axis)
similarly. The non-monotonic trends for GUI FPR
and GUI FNR are due to the FRs for edges out of
switch-based factoring dispatchers dominating the
total FRs when no or little opaque predicates are
inserted, whereas FRs for opaque predicate edges
dominate the total FRs as more such predicates get
inserted. FPRs (and FNRs) for both types of edges
decrease (and increase) when more opaque predi-
cates are inserted, but they start at different values
for 0% opaque predicate probability and converge to
different values for 100% probability.
• The soundish attack does not change the false rates
significantly.
• After the unsound attack, the GUI FPR is lower
that in the unattacked case when opaque predicates
are actually insered and monotonically decreasing
due to the increasing number of resolved opaque
predicates. The GUI FNR does not change compared
to the unattacked program.
To conclude our sensitivity analysis, we report how well
pairs of code fragments originating from the same function
but split apart by factorisation are still put in the same
function by IDA Pro with increasing amounts of factoring
(1%, 10%, 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100%). Figure 31 shows
how the fraction of such broken pairs (i.e., split pairs not
put in the same function by the attacker-improved IDA
Pro) evolves when more factoring is applied for when (1)
no opaque predicates and (2) 20% opaque predicates are
inserted.
• Before attacking the program, when no opaque
predicates are inserted, the fraction of broken pairs
starts at about 55% when 1% is factored and increases
to about 75% when all factoring is applied. This
is evidence of the claim in Section 6.4 where we
stated that applying more factoring will result in
more broken pairs. When 20% opaque predicates are
inserted, the fraction starts at about 85% when little
factoring is applied, decreasing to about 80% with
increasing amounts of factoring.
• When no opaque predicates are inserted, the
soundish attack is able to reunite about 20% of
the broken pairs when little factoring is applied.
With increasing amounts of factoring, the fraction
of broken pairs that get reunited shrinks due to the
total number of pairs increasing. When 20% opaque
predicates are inserted, the effects are smaller yet
similar.
• When no opaque predicates are inserted, the un-
sound attack does not yield better results than the
soundish attack. When 20% opaque predicates are
inserted, some more broken pairs can be reunited,
due to opaque predicates not being fully drawn in
the GUI, but this advantage quickly diminishes when
more factoring is applied.
When we compare the discussed results for 436.cactusADM
with those for the other benchmarks, we observe that
whereas the number of broken and fixed pairs varies, the
conclusions remain the same.
6.8 Experimental setup
We evaluated the considered benchmarks on two ARM
development boards. One is an Arndale Board that runs
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Fig. 28: Sensitivity analysis on the fake switch entry insertion probability (X-axis)
Ubuntu 15.04, the other is a SABRE Lite i.MX6 board run-
ning Android 4.4.3 (KitKat). Table 9 lists the most important
specifications of each board, along with the compiler ver-
sions used to compile the benchmarks with.
For the SPEC benchmarks, we collected an execution
profile with the train inputs. Of course, the overhead was
measured on other inputs. For the 445.gobmk benchmark,
we used the default ref inputs. We could not use them for
the 436.cactusADM and 454.calculix benchmarks, as they
are impractical to perform measurements on the relatively
slow development boards. Instead, we slightly modified the
436.cactusADM ref input, and we used an alternative input
for 454.calculix from its test suite (beamnldyp.inp) [40].
For the SLM use case we used a fixed set of inputs to
generate the execution profile and to measure the overhead.
These inputs were carefully chosen to cover as much of the
library as possible.
For the DRM use case, we collected an execution profile
by logging in on the GUI application, after which we played
an encrypted and an unencrypted movie. As discussed in
Section 6.6, we did not measure the overhead for this use
case due to its interactive nature.
7 RELATED WORK
7.1 Code factoring
Existing work on code factoring focused mainly on com-
paction, i.e., the removal of duplicate code to make binaries
smaller. Production tool chains already include optimisation
passes to factor identical procedures: Microsofts Visual C++
compiler [27], GNU GCC [41][42], Gold [43] and LLVM [44].
In academic research, Debray et al. [12], De Sutter et al. [28]
and Von Koch et al. [29] have developed code factoring
techniques to factor almost identical code on the basic block
level (the former two) and the procedural level (the latter
two). Computation time is reduced by defining a fingerprint
for each basic block and/or procedure and small differences
between procedures are compensated for by parameterizing
the factored code. Debray et al. and De Sutter et al. mitigated
differences between basic blocks by using an ad-hoc register
renaming algorithm and by canonicalising the instruction
schedule. This was not an issue for Von Koch et al. because
LLVM IR was used. Recently, Rocha et al. [30] used a DNA
sequence alignment algorithm from bioinformatics to iden-
tify factoring candidates and to compensate for differences
between them. Similar to the work by Von Koch et al.,
they only support factoring on the procedural level but, as
they implemented their technique on LLVM IR, they are not
bound by register allocation schemes.
Inspired by the existing implementations, we factor
(sub)blocks for obfuscation rather than compaction. Thus,
we can give up on code size overhead to factor more code.
Our technique is orthogonal and complementary to whole
function merging, which by definition does not obfuscate
function boundaries. Importantly, we rely only on intrapro-
cedural control flow idioms rather than calls and returns.
7.2 Obfuscations
Many obfuscation transformations exist, each with its own
strengths and weaknesses, as surveyed by Schrittwieser et
al. [45]. Collberg et al. [46] categorized obfuscation tech-
niques into layout (e.g., code layout randomization), control
flow and data transformations. One example of control flow
obfuscations are opaque predicates. These can range from
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Fig. 29: Sensitivity analysis on the probability that fake edges are fall-through (X-axis)
Linux environment Android environment
Board ArndaleBoard Boundary Devices
5250-A BD-SL-i.MX6
CPU ARM Cortex-A15 ARM Cortex-A9
(1.7 GHz) (1 GHz)
OS Ubuntu 15.04 Android 4.4.3 KitKat
(kernel 4.3.0) (kernel 3.10.53)
Compiler GNU GCC 4.8.1 GNU GCC 4.8
binutils 2.23.2 binutils 2.23.2
TABLE 9: Development board and software specifications
simple [47] to complex [48]. While easy to implement, the
simple ones are not resilient against modern attacks such as
symbolic or concolic execution [19]. Recently, some alterna-
tives were proposed to counter these advanced attacks. The
range dividers of Banescu et al. [36] introduce additional
feasible code paths, exploding the analysis complexity. The
bi-opaque predicates of Xu et al. [49] exploit the NP-hard
problem of resolving symbolic memory. Zobernig et al.
researched a technique to make opaque predicates indis-
tinguishable from the program’s predicates by hashing the
calculation of each (opaque) predicate [50], [51]. Attackers
need to invert the hash function to prove the opaqueness of
a predicate, a process that is known to be impossible but for
brute-forcing. Our use of opaque predicates in this paper
is orthogonal to mentioned work, as our work focuses on
choosing the target of the fake edge, which needs to be done
whatever the kind of computation is used to implement the
opaque predicate that steers the conditional branch.
Another example of control flow obfuscations are branch
functions [10], which replace direct with indirect branches to
thwart code identification heuristics. Control flow flatten-
ing [24] is another obfuscation, which replaces direct with
dispatcher-based control flow. Our factoring dispatchers re-
semble these obfuscations, but focus on thwarting function
repartitioning heuristics, as we aim for attackers to identify
fake inter-component control flow paths to confuse them
even more and to hide the boundaries of components, rather
than to obfuscate the components’ internals themselves.
Asghar et al. propose another way to obfuscate the control
flow of a program by removing conditional branches [52].
Contrary to other techniques, they avoid the insertion of
additional calculations but instead build on the increased
complexity of the linearized calculations.
Obfuscations can be inserted at source level [53], by
compilers [54] or by binary code rewriters [11]. As we
want to hide the boundaries of linked-in components, we
obviously opted for a post link-time rewriter.
8 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We presented a novel technique to apply code factoring
across component boundaries with intraprocedural control
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Fig. 30: Sensitivity analysis on the opaque predicate insertion probability (X-axis)
flow idioms. We combined our technique with existing
opaque predicates with which we also inject fake direct
control flow accros component boundaries, and with fine-
grained code layout randomization. In our evaluation with
IDA Pro, a commonly used, state-of-the-art reverse engi-
neering tool, we demonstrated that this thwarts disassem-
bler and CFG reconstruction heuristics and that a program
protected with our technique is more resilient to some
known attacks. We can conclude that our technique in-
creases the potency and resilience of protected applications
against modern reverse engineering attacks.
In future research, approaches to generate more similar,
and thus factorable code fragments can be investigated,
rather that only identifying existing ones. Another research
path can be the use of machine learning techniques to steer
the insertion of fake control flow, so that attack tools are
more purposively thwarted rather than stochastically.
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